What happened
On 13 January 2001, a Mainair Blade 582 microlight, registration G-MZCN, was participating in a group flight near Enson, Staffordshire. The pilot, accompanied by a passenger, was flying in formation with three other aircraft to a destination near Lichfield. The flight was expected to take approximately 90 minutes, with the pilot planning to use one fuel tank for the outbound leg and the second for the return.
During the flight, the group encountered a stronger headwind than anticipated, with components reaching up to 25 knots. Approximately 1 hour and 40 minutes into the flight, the engine lost power. The passenger observed the pilot attempting to reach for the fuel selector lever, but engine power did not recover. The pilot subsequently executed a forced landing in a grass field. The aircraft struck the ground with significant force, causing the trike to topple onto its side. While the passenger escaped with serious injuries, the pilot sustained a fatal neck injury.
The investigation
Investigators examined the wreckage of G-MZCN and conducted engine tests. They established that the engine and airframe were in serviceable condition prior to the accident. Testing confirmed that the engine stopped due to fuel exhaustion while the underseat tank was selected. Although 15 litres of fuel remained in the rear tank, the pilot had no time to switch tanks and successfully restart the engine, as the aircraft lacked a pull-starter and relied on a battery-driven starter that required significant time to operate.
Further examination of the fuel system revealed that the underseat tank contained only 0.5 litres of unusable fuel at the time of the crash. The investigation also noted that the fuel selector valve's detent was ineffective, and the pilot's ability to monitor fuel levels was severely limited. The fuel gauge for the underseat tank was not visible from the pilot's seat, and the selector valve was positioned behind the pilot, making rapid manipulation difficult during an emergency.
Findings
- The engine failed because the underseat fuel tank ran dry.
- The pilot was likely unaware of the decreasing fuel level due to the lack of a visible fuel gauge or low-level warning system in the primary field of view.
- An unexpected headwind increased the flight duration, leading to the depletion of the selected tank.
- The aircraft's fuel selector position was difficult to access quickly during flight.
- The lack of radio communication prevented the pilot from receiving updates from the other aircraft regarding their progress and fuel status.
- The severity of the pilot's fatal injury may have been exacerbated by the forward movement of the passenger during the hard landing, as the aircraft was only equipped with lap straps.