Accident Overview
On the day of the accident, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82 passenger aircraft, registered EC-HFP, was destroyed when it crashed during takeoff at Madrid-Barajas Airport (MAD), Spain. The aircraft was operating Spanair flight JK5022 from Madrid to Gran Canaria. Of the 154 occupants, including six crew members, all were killed; 18 passengers sustained serious injuries.
Sequence of Events
The aircraft was initially cleared for engine start at 13:06:15 and taxied to runway 36L from parking stand T21. Flaps were extended to 11°. After receiving takeoff clearance at 13:24:57, the crew reported a problem with an overheating Ram Air Temperature (RAT) probe and returned to the apron, parking at remote stand R11. Maintenance confirmed the malfunction, consulted the Minimum Equipment List (MEL), and opened the circuit breaker for the heating element. The aircraft was then dispatched, topped off with 1080 liters of kerosene, and at 14:08:01 cleared for engine start and taxi to runway 36L.
During taxi, the crew performed checklists. At 14:23:14, with the aircraft at the threshold of runway 36L, it was cleared for takeoff. The crew released the brakes at 14:23:19, and engine power increased to a maximum of 1.95 EPR. At 14:24:06, the crew called "V1" at 147 knots calibrated airspeed, and "rotate" at 14:24:08 at 154 knots. The stall warning stick shaker activated at 14:24:14, followed by three stall warnings. Impact occurred at 14:24:23.
Analysis of Flight Data
Throughout the takeoff run and until the end of the flight data recorder (DFDR) recording, the flap position sensors indicated 0°. The takeoff warning system (TOWS) did not activate. After liftoff, the aircraft reached a maximum altitude of 40 feet before descending, with significant roll oscillations: a left roll, then a right roll of 20°, followed by another left roll and an abrupt right roll of 32°. The tail cone, right wing tip, and right engine cowlings impacted the ground first, about 60 meters to the right of the runway centerline and 3207.5 meters from the threshold. The aircraft then traveled 448 meters on the ground, crossing an embankment, and came to rest in the bed of the Vega stream, where a fire ensued. The wreckage was scattered over 1093 meters.
Probable Cause and Contributing Factors
The official investigation determined the probable cause as follows: The crew lost control of the airplane as a consequence of entering a stall immediately after takeoff due to an improper airplane configuration involving the non-deployment of the slats/flaps following a series of mistakes and omissions, along with the absence of the improper takeoff configuration warning. The crew did not identify the stall warnings and did not correct said situation after takeoff. They momentarily retarded the engine throttles, increased the pitch angle, and did not correct the bank angle, leading to a deterioration of the stall condition. The crew did not detect the configuration error because they did not properly use the checklists, which contain items to select and verify the position of the flaps/slats, when preparing the flight.
Contributing factors included: the absence of an improper takeoff configuration warning due to the failure of the TOWS to operate (reason not reliably established), and improper crew resource management (CRM) that did not prevent deviation from procedures during unscheduled interruptions.