What happened
On 2 May 2006, an Airbus A320, registration EK-32009, operated by Armavia Airlines, was performing a night passenger flight from Yerevan, Armenia, to Sochi, Russia. The flight was operating under instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).
During the approach to Sochi, the flight crew initially considered returning to Yerevan due to weather conditions but ultimately decided to continue the descent. While performing the turn to final, the aircraft overshot the runway centerline. As the aircraft descended, the air traffic controller provided updates regarding a dropping cloud ceiling. At approximately 22:10 UTC, the crew reported landing gear extension and readiness for landing. However, shortly after, the controller instructed the crew to stop their descent and execute a right turn and climb to 600 meters due to the cloud ceiling dropping to 100 meters.
Following this instruction, the aircraft's last communication occurred at 22:12:35 UTC. At 22:13:03 UTC, the aircraft struck the surface of the Black Sea, resulting in the total destruction of the aircraft. All 113 occupants, including 105 passengers and 8 crew members, were killed.
The investigation
The investigation, conducted by the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC), examined the flight crew's performance, the aircraft's automated systems, and the interactions between the crew and air traffic control (ATC). Investigators analyzed the flight recorders, the crew's training records, and the meteorological data at the time of the accident. The inquiry also looked into the regulatory discrepancies regarding how international flights were managed by the Sochi controller, specifically regarding the authority to abort approaches based on local weather evolution.
Findings
Several critical factors contributed to the accident:
- The crew experienced a breakdown in teamwork and situational awareness following the unexpected instruction to stop their descent. After the controller's order, the Captain ceased communicating effectively, and the Co-pilot became distracted by lengthy instructions from ATC.
- There was a significant lack of adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), particularly regarding task-sharing and verbal call-outs during the missed approach.
- The Captain's decision to manually input an unnecessary waypoint (LAMET) into the flight management system increased workload and delayed the start of the descent.
- A high level of stress and irritation developed between the crew and ATC due to a perceived "power struggle" and the controller's frequent updates on weather minima.
- The crew's mental model of the situation was destabilized by the controller's instruction, which focused on specific maneuvering actions rather than an explicit order to execute a missed approach procedure.