What happened
On July 4, 2012, a Piper Aircraft PA-34-220T Seneca III, registration D-GABE, was performing a radio relay mission for the Tour de France cycling race. The aircraft, operated by Pixair Survey, was flying under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) to monitor a vehicle within the race caravan. After approximately 6 hours and 25 minutes of flight, the pilot transitioned from the mission area toward the Rouen - Vallée de Seine aerodrome.
During the final approach to runway 22, the right engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion. The pilot attempted a go-around, but the left engine subsequently failed as well. The aircraft collided with a tree in a private garden approximately 600 meters from the runway threshold. The pilot sustained minor injuries, but the aircraft was destroyed.
The investigation
The BEA investigation focused on the fuel management and the operational preparation of the mission. Investigators found that the right fuel tank was empty at the time of the accident, while the left tank still contained approximately 13 USG.
Evidence showed that prior to the approach, the pilot had switched the left engine's fuel supply to the right tank via the "cross feed" setting to balance the tanks, as the left engine had been consuming slightly more fuel than the right. The pilot failed to revert this setting or verify the fuel selectors during the approach checklist. Furthermore, the investigation examined the operator's mission planning, noting that the flight duration was very close to the aircraft's maximum endurance and that the actual fuel consumption was higher than the operator's estimates.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was fuel exhaustion resulting from the pilot's failure to monitor fuel levels and verify selector positions during the approach.
- The pilot's oversight was likely exacerbated by fatigue after completing over 27 hours of flight time in four days, as well as a loss of situational awareness during the high-workload approach phase.
- The operator had insufficient time to prepare for this specific mission type, leading to an inadequate assessment of the risks associated with long-duration flights.
- The fuel reserves were critically low because the actual fuel consumption rate was approximately 6% higher than the operator's calculated estimates.
- A previous near-exhaustion event three days prior to the accident was not used as a learning opportunity to reassess safety margins.