Accident Overview
A Piper PA-31 Navajo Chieftain, registration C-GIPB, departed Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, at 2043 mountain daylight time on a night instrument flight rules (IFR) charter flight to Fort Liard. The aircraft carried one pilot and five passengers. Upon arrival at Fort Liard, in conditions of moderate to heavy snow, the pilot initiated a non-directional beacon approach with a circling procedure for Runway 02. At approximately 2233, the aircraft struck a gravel bar on the west shoreline of the Liard River, 1.3 nautical miles short of the threshold of Runway 02, and 0.3 nautical mile to the left of the runway centreline. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, but no fire ensued.
Injuries and Damage
Three passengers were fatally injured, and the pilot and two passengers were seriously injured. The emergency locator transmitter activated and was received by the search and rescue satellite system. Two Canadian Forces aircraft were dispatched to conduct a search. The wreckage was electronically located the following morning, and a civilian helicopter arrived at the accident site approximately 10 hours after the occurrence.
Investigation Findings
The investigation identified that for undetermined reasons, the pilot did not maintain adequate altitude during the night circling approach in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), leading to the aircraft striking the ground. Additionally, the pilot and front seat passenger were not wearing available shoulder harnesses as required by regulation, which likely contributed to the severity of their injuries. Several risk factors were noted: the aircraft was not fitted with a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) or radio altimeter, nor was it required to be; the pilot used an unauthorized remote altimeter setting that would have caused cockpit altimeters to read approximately 200 feet higher than actual altitude; the pilot did not meet the night recency requirements necessary to carry passengers as specified in Canadian Aviation Regulations (CAR) 401.05(2); risk management responsibilities were placed almost entirely on the pilot; and while the company had a voluntary safety officer and safety program, the program may not have been directed at needs. Other findings included that approximately 28 hours of flight time logged as multi-engine dual would not qualify as flight experience for a higher license; CARs do not define 'flight familiarization', 'flight experience', or 'dual'; search delays were caused by inaccurate SARSAT location information, time to locate SAR aircraft, darkness, and poor weather; and a 406 MHz ELT interfaced with GPS would have likely permitted timelier rescue. The report also noted that 703 Air Taxi operations continue to have a much higher accident rate than 704 Commuter and 705 Airline operations.