Incident Overview
During the approach to Runway 6, the captain had ILS glideslope data available but did not follow the ILS glideslope. The approach was conducted in conditions where ground fog partially obscured the airport environment, which contributed to the captain's failure to recognize that the airplane was high on both the approach and landing. The airplane subsequently collided with a blast fence, resulting in its destruction and occupant injuries.
Contributing Factors
The partial obscuration of the airport environment due to ground fog was a factor in the captain's failure to recognize the airplane's high position. Additionally, the passenger seats had been improperly assembled using unapproved parts, and the seat belts had been installed incorrectly. The FAA's interaction and communication with local communities, although persistent, were unsuccessful in gaining support for runway safety area improvements and for the installation of approach lighting for Runway 6.
Findings
The official probable cause identified the captain's failure to use the available ILS glideslope, his failure to execute a go-around when conditions were not suitable for landing, and his failure to land at a point sufficient to allow for a safe stopping distance. It further stated that the fatalities were caused by the presence of the non-frangible blast fence and the absence of a safety area at the end of the runway.