Incident Overview
On 11 January 2001, a Piper PA-34-200T Seneca, registration G-RVRB, was conducting a public transport positioning flight from Newcastle to Manchester International Airport. The aircraft landed on Runway 06R, a newly constructed parallel runway that was still undergoing calibration checks and not yet open for commercial traffic. The incident occurred at approximately 1354 UTC, one month before the runway's official inauguration on 5 February 2001.
Sequence of Events
The pilot, the sole occupant, contacted Manchester Approach at 1337 hrs, reporting heading 185° and having copied ATIS Information X. The controller advised radar vectoring for a VOR/DME or visual approach to Runway 06L, positioning the aircraft as number five in the landing sequence. After vectoring onto a left base leg, the pilot was cleared to visually follow an Airbus 321 and later instructed to extend the base leg to the east to allow a Boeing 757 to depart from Runway 06L. The pilot flew a heading of approximately 160°, passing southeast of Knutsford. Upon being cleared for a visual approach and told to turn left towards Knutsford for final approach to Runway 06L, the pilot turned and saw a runway with clearly visible edge lighting, which he mistakenly identified as Runway 06L. In reality, Knutsford lies on the extended centerline of Runway 06R.
The aircraft was then transferred to the Tower frequency at 1350 hrs. The pilot reported a visual final approach and was cleared to land on Runway 06L at 1353 hrs. However, the aircraft touched down on Runway 06R, overflying a vehicle situated on the threshold. The approach lighting and PAPI for Runway 06R were not illuminated, while those for Runway 06L were operational.
Controller and Pilot Actions
A controller handover was occurring around the time of landing. The oncoming controller, briefed that G-RVRB had been cleared to land on 06L, observed the aircraft through binoculars and believed it was lined up for 06L. He did not notice the imminent touchdown on 06R. After realizing the mistake, the controller asked the pilot if he had intended to land on 06R, to which the pilot replied "negative." A leader vehicle was dispatched to guide the aircraft onto the operational maneuvering area.
Contributing Factors
The pilot attributed the misidentification to high workload during single-pilot operations, alternating between high-speed approach and delaying maneuvers in strong gusty wind. The lack of a radiating ILS on 06L, which could have indicated incorrect alignment, was also noted. The positioning of the aircraft east of the 06L final approach track, towards Knutsford (on the 06R extended centerline), was considered highly significant. Additionally, the pilot's previous experience landing on Runway 24R had built a visual model of selecting the "closest threshold on the right side of the airfield," which he applied incorrectly to the easterly approach pattern.
Post-Incident Actions
At the time of the incident, a NOTAM was in effect advising that Runway 06R/24L was not available and that pilots should ensure identification of Runway 06L/24R for landing. Following the incident, an additional NOTAM prohibited visual approaches by IFR-equipped aircraft to Runway 06L. Manchester International Airport subsequently implemented procedures to reduce the risk of similar events, including operating only one set of approach lighting and one ILS at a time, and installing an Aerodrome Traffic Monitor with Approach Monitoring Aid.