Flight Events
During the initial climb after departure in gusting wind conditions with a 600-foot ceiling and 1/2 mile visibility in snow, a "throbbing or surging" sound was heard. Moments later, the airplane came "straight down" and impacted the ground.
Wreckage Examination
Examination of the wreckage revealed that the fuel selector switch for the right engine had been in the "X-FEED" position during the accident.
Document Examination
Three documents pertaining to operation of an Aerostar were discovered in the wreckage: two airplane flight manuals (AFMs) from different manufacturers, and a checklist.
The first AFM had the name of both the pilot and the operator on the cover. It had been published 4 years prior to the manufacture of the accident airplane and contained information for a Ted Smith Aerostar Model 601P, which the operator had previously owned. This document contained no warnings regarding the use of the crossfeed system during takeoff.
The second AFM was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved AFM for the accident airplane. It advised that the fuel selector "X-FEED" position should be used in "level coordinated flight only." It also advised that each engine fuel selector "must be in the ON position for takeoff, climb, descent, approach, and landing." It warned that if the airplane was not in level coordinated flight attitude, "engine power interruptions may occur on one or both engines" when "X-FEED" is selected "due to unporting of the respective engine's fuel supply intake port." The checklist in this AFM, under "STARTING ENGINES," required a check of the crossfeed system prior to engine start by selecting each fuel selector to "ON," then selecting "X-FEED," and after verifying valve actuation and annunciator light illumination, returning the fuel selector to "ON." Under "BEFORE TAKEOFF," it required that the fuel selectors be checked in the "ON" position and that the "X-FEED" annunciator light was out prior to takeoff.
The pilot's checklist consisted of multiple pages inserted into plastic protective sleeves and included both typed and handwritten information. A review of the section titled "BEFORE TAKEOFF" revealed that the checklist item "Fuel Selectors - ON Position," which was listed in the AFM, had been omitted.
Probable Cause
The pilot's incorrect selection of the right engine fuel selector position, which resulted in fuel starvation of the right engine, a loss of the right engine's power, and a loss of control during initial climb. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's inadequate preflight planning and preparation, and his improper use of the manufacturer's published normal operating procedures.