Casualties unknown

2013-08-05: Beech 55 Baron (F-BNOK) — FR

FR

On August 5, 2013, a Beech 55 Baron (registration F-BNOK) was involved in an aviation accident near FR. This summary draws on records from the French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA).

Sourcesthe French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA)Primary reportUpdated 1785058346Data APIEditorial standards

On 5 August 2013, a privately operated Beech 55 Baron made a gear-up landing at Figari aerodrome after the pilot misinterpreted a dim green landing gear indicator and later could not use the emergency extension crank because a bag blocked it. The aircraft sustained substantial damage.

Flight and Initial Approach

On 5 August 2013, at approximately 8:15 local time, a Beech 55 Baron, registration F-BNOK, departed Figari aerodrome for a local flight. Around 8:35, during the final approach to runway 05, the pilot completed the landing gear extension sequence but observed that the green indicator light for gear-down lock did not illuminate. He checked the circuit breakers and tested the indicator, but it remained off. The pilot requested confirmation from the air traffic controller, who asked him to abort the approach and perform a low pass in front of the tower. During the low pass, the controller reported that the gear appeared to be extended and offered the pilot the option to retract and extend the gear again while on the downwind leg.

Gear Cycling and Emergency Attempt

The pilot executed a circuit and performed several gear cycles. On the second low pass, the controller noted that the gear doors were open but the landing gear was not down. The controller then suggested the pilot conduct an emergency gear extension procedure in a holding area south of the aerodrome. The pilot proceeded south but was unable to operate the emergency extension crank because a piece of luggage had shifted and blocked access to the crank handle. At 8:45, the controller asked whether the pilot wished to land at Figari or divert. The pilot chose to remain at Figari, and the controller proposed landing on the grass beside the runway, confirming that the gear doors were open and the gear retracted. The aerodrome fire service was requested to cover the runway with foam. The pilot landed on runway 23, which had been foamed, at 9:02 with the landing gear not extended. The aircraft sustained severe damage.

Technical Findings

Post-accident examination of the landing gear system revealed that the gear doors were open and the landing gear was in an intermediate position between fully retracted and fully extended. The gear actuation chain was functional in both normal and emergency modes, and the gear would lock normally when properly extended. The green indicator light's dimmer knob was found set to its lowest brightness level, making the light very difficult to see in daylight conditions. The audible warning for landing gear not down was operational, but the pilot did not recall hearing it. The emergency extension crank, located behind the front seats, was obstructed by the pilot's bag, which had slid from its original position after the preflight inspection. The autopilot was inoperative at the time, preventing the pilot from releasing the controls to free the bag.

Pilot Comments and Weather

The pilot reported that during the gear extensions, he did not hear the usual mechanical sounds. He noted that he might not have paid attention to the sound during the first approach, and that during subsequent extensions, the sound could have been masked by engine noise because the engines were not at idle. The pilot had 938 total flight hours, more than half on type, with 4 hours in the preceding three months, all on type. Weather conditions were calm, CAVOK, with a temperature of 28°C.

Conclusion from the Investigation

The investigation concluded that the landing gear was likely extended and locked during the initial approach, but the dim indicator led the pilot to suspect a malfunction. The cause of the incomplete gear extension during the subsequent cycles could not be determined. The bag obstructing the emergency crank prevented the pilot from executing the emergency extension procedure. Some operators recommend flying with two pilots when the autopilot is inoperative.