What happened
On April 23, 2023, at approximately 17:16, a Textron Aviation Inc. 150L, registration TF-TWO, was performing a takeoff from runway 31 at Reykjavik Airport. The aircraft was being operated by a student pilot who had previously completed a training flight with an instructor earlier that day.
During the takeoff roll, as the aircraft approached the runway intersection, the pilot observed a runway inspection vehicle traveling along runway 01, directly in the aircraft's path. The pilot immediately applied brakes and reduced engine power, though the aircraft did not come to a complete stop. The vehicle, traveling at approximately 80 km/h, passed through the intersection quickly. The pilot continued the takeoff and departed the airport according to instructions. Following the incident, the pilot notified the tower that a vehicle had been on the runway; the air traffic controller confirmed they had also observed the vehicle.
The investigation
The RNSA investigation established that the vehicle operator had been granted "open" authorization for runway inspections, allowing movement across all runways and taxiways, starting from runway 31. The operator had been performing bird dispersal duties at both ends of the runway.
At the time of the incident, the air traffic controller was managing multiple frequencies (tower, ground, and vehicle) and handling a flight plan request via telephone. While the controller had placed a visual indicator in the workstation to signal that runway inspections were underway, it could not be confirmed if the warning light was actually activated. Furthermore, the investigation found that the vehicle and the aircraft were not on the same communication frequency, meaning the two parties were unaware of each other's presence.
Findings
- The primary cause of the near-collision was the lack of direct communication between the vehicle and the aircraft due to them operating on different radio frequencies.
- The air traffic controller did not provide the pilot of TF-TWO with information regarding the ongoing runway inspection.
- The vehicle operator was operating under an "open" authorization, which is a practice used to reduce workload but increases risk during inspections.
- The controller's visibility of the vehicle was potentially obstructed by the tower window frame, and it was unclear if the vehicle's warning lights were active.
- The vehicle and the aircraft were moving at high speeds (approximately 80 km/h for the vehicle and 30-40 knots for the aircraft), resulting in a minimum separation of only about 30-40 meters.