History of the Flight
The crew arrived at East Midlands Airport at 0500 hrs, one hour before the scheduled report time of 0600 hrs. The commander, a newly appointed line training captain, used the extra hour to brief the first officer, who was on his second day of line training. The crew were to operate four sectors that day. The first two sectors were flown without incident. On the third sector, the aircraft was given a late descent clearance, resulting in a steeper than normal approach. The commander took control briefly but handed back to the first officer for the landing, which was normal but resulted in a late touchdown. For the final sector, the commander decided the first officer should act as pilot flying to improve his handling techniques.
During the final sector, the first officer carried out an auto-coupled ILS approach to Runway 27 after being vectored onto the extended centreline. The crew were asked to slow down due to a departing Boeing 737, which they complied with. The aircraft was stable and aligned when the autopilot was disconnected at approximately 200 to 300 feet. The first officer reported that at around 100 to 150 feet, the aircraft began to drift off the centreline and balloon upward. After crossing the threshold, the aircraft floated above the runway, losing speed before the commander took control. Almost immediately, the aircraft landed heavily on the main landing gear and pitched forward, causing the nose wheel to impact the runway. The commander reported a noticeable vibration and, believing the nose tyres had burst, applied gentle braking, turned off the runway onto taxiway D, and stopped. After consulting with fire crew, it was decided that passenger evacuation was not required; the engines were shut down for normal disembarkation.
The commander stated that the situation developed rapidly from a normal approach and that he failed to react early enough. He was aware of fatigue from being on his third day of early starts, having been involved in teaching first officers on their first days of line training.
Engineering Aspects
The rims of both nose wheels disintegrated on impact, wearing down to the hubs. Debris from the wheel rims damaged one blade of the No 2 propeller and caused minor damage to the external hydraulic tunnel on the lower forward fuselage. A heavy landing check performed by maintenance found no further damage, but later inspection of the main wheels revealed cracking around the drive keys. A fireman who observed the landing reported the main wheels touched down just after a rapid exit turn-off, approximately 960 metres beyond the threshold. Nose wheel rim marks were found 50 to 100 metres beyond that point. The left nose tyre was found intact, while the right tyre was in two halves. The pattern of damage indicated the nose wheels failed close to the first rim marks, due to sudden overload of the rims, with no pre-existing damage. The tyres had been installed on 16 January 1999 with no prior incidents.
Flight Data Recorder Analysis
The Cockpit Voice Recorder confirmed the crew's recollection. The Flight Data Recorder showed the aircraft descended from about 100 ft at approximately 10 ft/s (600 ft/min) at 125 KIAS (Vref was 117 kt). At around 60 ft, elevator angle increased, pitch attitude rose to 3°, then oscillated, reaching a maximum pitch of 6.7° at about 2 ft radio height and 110 KIAS. The rate of descent decreased, and the aircraft floated. The elevator then decreased, pitching down to 0°, followed by touchdown one second later with a peak normal acceleration of 2.47g at a pitch attitude of 1.8° and 107 KIAS. Pitch attitude then increased to 5.3° with no elevator movement, and 2.5 seconds later another peak of 1.52g occurred at 2.11° pitch. The aircraft decelerated rapidly, with a peak longitudinal deceleration of -0.49g, 4 seconds after the second touchdown.
Operations Manual Extracts
Section 9.4.0 of the operator's Operations Manual specifies the flare and touchdown procedure: flare should be initiated a few feet above the runway, raising the nose 5° to 6° from approach attitude, with touchdown attitude of 4° to 5° nose-up. Power levers should be retarded to ground idle after touchdown, not before, to avoid hard landing. Floating above the runway by increasing nose-up attitude is discouraged as it increases landing distance and risks tail strike. If a bounce occurs, the crew should hold or re-establish normal landing attitude and add power as needed. For a high, hard bounce, a go-around is recommended.
Flight and Duty Times
The operator's Flight and Duty Times Limitations Scheme aims to ensure crew are adequately rested. For duties starting between 0600 and 0759 hrs involving four sectors, the maximum flight duty period is 10 hours 45 minutes without commander's discretion. The crew reported at 0600 hrs and operated a schedule that resulted in a duty period of 7 hours. The commander had commenced line training duties two days earlier, having flown with a new first officer. On the day of the accident, he had started duty at 0500 hrs, one hour earlier than required.
The investigation did not establish a probable cause for the event.