Casualties unknown

2002-06-01: SCHLEICHER K8 GLIDER (FKJ) — Hinton-in-the-Hedges Airfield, Northamptonshire, GB

Hinton-in-the-Hedges Airfield, Northamptonshire, GB

On June 1, 2002, a SCHLEICHER K8 GLIDER (registration FKJ) was involved in an aviation accident near Hinton-in-the-Hedges Airfield, Northamptonshire, GB. This summary draws on records from the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB).

Sourcesthe UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)Primary reportUpdated 1785053200Data APIEditorial standards

On 1 June 2002, a Schleicher Ka-8B glider and a free-fall parachutist collided near Hinton-in-the-Hedges Airfield, resulting in fatal injuries to both. The glider pilot was not wearing a parachute. Operational coordination issues were identified.

Accident Overview

On 1 June 2002 at approximately 1400 UTC, a Schleicher Ka-8B glider (registration FKJ) and a parachutist collided in mid-air near Hinton-in-the-Hedges Airfield. The glider pilot, aged 69, held a Silver C Gliding Certificate and had 547 hours of flying experience. The parachutist was one of three skydivers descending from 12,000 feet. The collision resulted in fatal injuries to both individuals, and the glider was destroyed.

Flight Operations

The skydiving centre and gliding club had operated at the same airfield for several years. An agreed operating procedure required the gliding club Duty Instructor and the parachute Drop Zone Controller to coordinate daily. On the accident day, they met and agreed on a cone of operation and runway usage. The parachute aircraft initially used a track of 190° magnetic, later changed to 180°, but this change was not communicated to the gliding club. The gliding club used grass Runway 15 for takeoff and grass Runway 24 for landing.

The Collision

Three parachutists were performing formation free-fall from 12,000 feet. At about 4,000 feet, they separated to deploy parachutes at 2,200 feet. One parachutist noticed a glider approximately 800 feet below, fell past it, and deployed his main canopy. As he looked up, he saw wreckage falling, indicating a collision between another parachutist and the glider. The glider pilot was not wearing a parachute.

Operational Context

The British Parachute Association (BPA) and British Gliding Association (BGA) oversaw the activities. The BGA's recommended practices encouraged parachute use but did not mandate it. The gliding club required radios tuned to 119.45 MHz within 5 nm. The pilot of FKJ had been assisted with pre-flight checks; a club member noted the absence of a parachute, but the pilot responded, "It'll be alright." The glider was serviceable, and the radio was operational.

The DZ controller and gliding club had differing understandings of the cone of operation: the controller believed it spanned 140° to 230°, while the DI understood 160° to 220°. The parachute aircraft's track change from 190° to 180° was not relayed to the gliding club.

Investigation Findings

The AAIB investigation did not assign a probable cause or make conclusions. The report documented the sequence of events and operational procedures.