What happened
On 10 April 2022, a De Havillandum DHC6-400, registered F-OMYR, was conducting an IFR2 proficiency check flight near Saint-François, Guadeloupe. While the crew was executing an RNP approach for runway 30, a Cessna 206, registered F-GERB, was performing a parachute dropping operation in the vicinity.
The air traffic controller, managing combined ground, tower, and approach positions, provided the crew of F-OMYR with traffic information regarding the parachuting aircraft but did not explicitly approve the start of the jump. Instead, the controller used phraseology that merely requested a report once the dropping was complete. Consequently, the crew of F-OMYR was unaware that a jump was in progress.
As the DHC6-400 proceeded with its approach, it crossed the flight path of a tandem parachutist at approximately 3,200 ft. The aircraft passed so close to the deployed canopy that the parachutists were able to read the aircraft's registration. There were no injuries or damage resulting from the incident.
The investigation
The BEA investigation focused on the coordination between air traffic control and the parachuting activity. The investigation established that the controller was recently qualified and had limited experience with the runway 30 configuration, which is rarely used. Furthermore, the Saint-François drop zone was not configured on the controller's radar display, meaning the system could not provide automated alerts for airspace intrusions.
The investigation also examined the controller's training, noting that recent simulation sessions had been conducted remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic and did not cover the specific complexities of managing parachuting activity during an approach procedure. Additionally, the controller had reported significant fatigue on the day of the event.
Findings
Several factors contributed to the loss of separation:
- The controller's lack of experience with the specific runway 30 configuration and the handling of parachuting activity.
- The use of non-standard phraseology, which failed to clearly communicate that the parachute drop had been authorized.
- The absence of the drop zone on the radar display, preventing the use of Area Proximity Warning (APW) functions.
- The controller's insufficient training regarding the potential for conflicts between IFR traffic and parachuting operations.
- The probable effect of the controller's fatigue.
Safety action
Following the incident, the Pointe-à-Pitre air traffic control unit implemented several safety improvements:
- The Saint-François drop zone is now configured on the IRMA radar display with an active Area Proximity Warning for the controlled portion of the airspace.
- Updated phraseology and procedures have been established, emphasizing that controllers must explicitly approve drops and may request confirmation that all parachutists have landed before clearing other traffic.
- The memorandum of understanding between the control unit and the parachuting company has been revised to clarify approval requirements.