Incident Overview
On 18 February 2018, at approximately 17:20 local time, a Robin DR400-120 registered F-GFXN operated by Aéroclub Jean Bertin executed a landing that ended outside the designated runway at Chavenay Villepreux aerodrome (Yvelines, France). The pilot, on a local private flight, had departed around 16:40. About 30 minutes later, he entered the downwind leg for runway 23 and subsequently turned final. Shortly before the roundout, the pilot was dazzled by the sun and landed off the runway. The aircraft came to rest between the runway edge markers and the taxiway edge markers, near the intersection of the runways. No injuries were reported.
Aircraft and Pilot Information
The aircraft was a Robin DR400-120 single-engine light aircraft. The pilot, aged 70, held a private pilot license issued in 2010 and had accumulated 341 flight hours, including 195 hours as pilot-in-command. His most recent flight prior to the incident was three months earlier, partly due to the aerodrome's closure during winter. By club policy, a flight with an instructor would have been required if the break exceeded four months; this flight was solo. The pilot wore photochromic corrective lenses that automatically tint in sunlight and reported having forgotten his cap that day.
Meteorological and Airport Conditions
The aerodrome had been closed for over two months due to winter weather rendering the runways unusable. The incident occurred on the day of reopening. The ATIS recorded at 16:30 indicated runway 23 in use, wind from 170° at 8 knots, visibility greater than 10 km. At landing, the controller reported variable wind from 140° to 200° at 6 knots. At 17:20, the sun's position was zenith 8.28°, azimuth 241.89°, nearly aligned with runway 23 (QFU 232°). Witnesses noted deteriorating visibility facing the sun.
Air Traffic Control
Three controllers were in the tower: a ground controller, a local controller, and an assistant. Shortly after F-GFXN joined the circuit, three other aircraft announced their return with potentially conflicting trajectories. When F-GFXN reported final, the local controller cleared it to land after checking the runway was clear. The controller's attention then shifted to the other conflicting traffic. Controllers were aware of the glare problem at that time of day but had received no pilot reports until the incident. Due to parallax errors from the tower's position relative to runway 23, assessing correct alignment on short final was difficult. After the event, pilots on final were informed of the glare risk, and about ten minutes later the active runway was changed to runway 10.
Pilot and Witness Accounts
The pilot stated that during final approach, visibility was sufficient, and his axis, glide path, and speed were correct. Only during the roundout and rollout was he completely blinded. Once on the ground, he had no sense of location. He recalled seeing the chevrons of the displaced threshold and two aircraft at the holding point during approach. He believed he landed on the runway and then veered left onto the taxiway. He never considered a go-around.
Pilots of two aircraft at holding point A5 (about 40 m from the runway edge) saw F-GFXN only at the last moment as it landed in front of them, off the runway, probably on the taxiway, approximately 20 m away. They alerted the controller.
An instructor flying behind F-GFXN executed a go-around on final, citing poor visibility but deeming landing possible; however, he chose to go around for instructional purposes and later landed on runway 10.
Conclusion
The investigation could not determine whether the landing occurred on the taxiway or on the strip between the runway and taxiway. The serious incident was due to the pilot continuing the landing, believing himself aligned with the runway but no longer distinguishing it on short final.