History of the Flight
On 13 October 2016, at approximately 15:35 local time, a Socata TB-20 Trinidad registered F-GGNZ and a Beechcraft 58 Baron registered F-GNSE were involved in a near-collision at Saint-Yan airport (Saône-et-Loire). The TB-20 was operated by ENAC (National School of Civil Aviation) on a local VFR training flight, carrying a student pilot, an instructor, and a passenger. The Be-58 was also operated by ENAC on an IFR cross-country training flight, with a student pilot and an instructor.
The TB-20 pilot had taken off for a local flight and returned to perform a left-hand traffic circuit to runway 33L, then extended the climb for a U-shaped landing circuit to the same runway. The pilot was in radio contact with the tower controller.
Earlier, a TB-10 (also operated by ENAC) had taken off from runway 33R for right-hand circuits. At the tower controller’s request, the TB-10 extended its climb-out, and when the pilot requested a right turn, the controller instructed a left turn into a remote crosswind leg.
At the holding point for runway 33R, the Be-58 pilot received clearance from the ground controller for an IFR omnidirectional departure toward RIMOR, conditional on maintaining visual contact with the TB-10 that had just taken off. The tower controller cleared the Be-58 for take-off after assessing that the TB-10 was no longer in conflict. The Be-58 pilot took off and turned left in accordance with the clearance. The Be-58 crew did not receive information about the TB-20.
While the TB-20 was on the downwind leg and the Be-58 had turned left heading south-west, the TB-20 pilot suddenly saw the Be-58 approaching on his left and performed a sudden evasive action. The Be-58 passed a few metres above the TB-20. The occupants of the Be-58 did not see the TB-20 and continued the flight. The TB-20 instructor requested to abort the flight and landed on runway 33R. An AIRPROX report was filed.
Additional Information
The airport has three parallel runways (15/33) and an air traffic control unit with separate tower, ground, and approach frequencies. Departure clearances were given by the ground controller in coordination with the approach controller. For an omnidirectional departure from runways 33 L/R, the pilot had to climb to 1,000 ft before proceeding directly to the assigned point. At 1,000 ft, certain paths could interfere with the downwind leg of the left-hand circuit.
The TB-20 instructor had approximately 6,000 flight hours; the student pilot held a PPL(A) with about 120 hours total (30 on the TB-20). The Be-58 instructor had nearly 10,000 hours; the student pilot, of Chinese nationality, was training for an ATPL(A) and had logged 219 hours (77 IFR, 27 on the Be-58). It was not possible to interview the Be-58 student pilot.
Statements from the TB-20 crew indicated that the student pilot extended the climb to 2,000 ft to prepare for a U-shaped circuit, then descended to 1,600 ft while turning to rejoin the downwind leg. He saw the Be-58 approaching on his left and pulled back on the stick. He was aware of three aircraft in the circuit but did not expect the Be-58’s path to conflict, especially since he had not received traffic information. He had heard the Be-58 pilot’s English communications but found them incomprehensible. Visibility was reduced. The TB-20 was equipped with a Traffic Advisory System (TAS), but none of the occupants recalled hearing a TAS alert before the near-collision. The TB-20’s TAS system had only one antenna, which could create a masking effect. It could not be determined whether a TAS alert was present.
The Be-58 instructor noted that Chinese student pilots often had poor English and limited experience, requiring high instructor concentration. The departure clearance was given long before take-off because of the preceding TB-10. He was surprised that the controller denied the TB-10 a right turn and had no information about the TB-20.
The TB-10 instructor stated that he was doing circuits with Chinese student pilots and handled radio communications due to their poor English. Traffic was heavy, and the tower controller seemed busy. On climb-out from runway 33R, the controller instructed him to extend climb and then turn left instead of right. Later, during the turn, he saw the TB-20 in the downwind leg and then the Be-58 crossing very close.
The ground controller reported that weather improved in the middle of the day, but visual monitoring remained difficult due to visibility. She had recently switched to the ground position. Departure clearances were given long before departures; the tower controller cleared take-offs and coordinated real-time traffic.
The tower controller said that traffic had been heavy with Chinese student pilots undergoing initial training. Weather sometimes made tracking difficult. Controllers had a radar display that lagged behind actual positions, especially during turns. He described his situational awareness: an aeroplane joining a right-hand circuit for the unpaved runway, a TB-20 on climb-out from runway 33R for a right-hand circuit, a TB-10 on climb-out from runway 33L for an initially right-hand circuit (which he denied to avoid conflict with the Be-58), and a Be-58 on an IFR departure heading south-west from runway 33L. He informed the Be-58 crew that take-off was conditional on sighting the preceding aircraft, following a recommendation from a previous occurrence. Clouds prevented him from seeing the aircraft properly, and he was relying on the radar display. He felt tired and planned to request a handover.
Previous Occurrences
A similar near-collision occurred on 26 June 2008 at the same airport, involving a TB-20 under instruction and a TB-20 taking off under IFR.