1 fatality

Ground Collision on Runway 27 at Paris-Charles de Gaulle (G-SSWN)

Paris-Roissy-CDG, FranceTaxiing

On May 25, 2000, a Short 330 (registration G-SSWN) operated by Streamline Aviation was involved in an aviation accident near Paris-Roissy-CDG, France while taxiing. One person was killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The following findings were identified: - Firstly, by the LOC controller’s erroneous perception of the position of the aircraft, this being reinforced by the context and the working methods, which led him to clear the Shorts to line up, - Secondly, by the… This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781203517Data APIEditorial standards

A Shorts cargo aircraft and an MD-83 collided on the runway at Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport after the Shorts was cleared to line up and wait while the MD-83 was taking off.

Incident Overview

On a cargo flight from Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport to Luton, a Shorts aircraft with two pilots was cleared to depart from cargo stand N51 and proceed to runway 27 at 02:38. Simultaneously, Air Liberté Flight 8807, an MD-83 registered as F-GHED, also taxied to runway 27 for a flight to Madrid.

Sequence of Events

At 02:44, the ground controller asked Streamline 200 (the Shorts' callsign) if they wished to enter runway 27 at an intermediate taxiway. The crew requested and were granted entry via Taxiway 16. At 02:50:49, the tower controller cleared the MD-83 for takeoff, stating, "Liberté 8807, autorisé au décollage 27, 230°, 10 à 15 kts." Immediately after, the controller instructed the Shorts to "line up and wait, number two."

As the MD-83 accelerated down the runway, the Shorts began to taxi onto the runway. At a speed of approximately 155 knots, the left wing of the MD-83 struck the cockpit of the Shorts aircraft. The MD-83 subsequently aborted its takeoff.

Official Findings

The investigation identified several causes and contributing factors:

  • The local controller (LOC) had an erroneous perception of the aircraft's position, reinforced by context and working methods, leading to the clearance for the Shorts to line up.
  • Systematic verification procedures in ATC were inadequate, preventing correction of the error.
  • The Shorts' crew did not dispel any doubts about the position of the number one aircraft before entering the runway.

Contributory factors included:

  • Light pollution near runway 27, impairing the LOC controller's direct view.
  • Difficulty accessing radar information: the ASTRE image was hard to read, and the AVISO image was not displayed at the control position.
  • Use of two languages for radio communications, meaning the Shorts crew were not aware that the MD-83 was taking off.
  • The angle between Taxiway 16 and the runway prevented the Shorts crew from performing a visual check before entry.
  • Lack of coordination between the ground (SOL) and local (LOC) controllers, exacerbated by the presence of an undefined third party.
  • A feedback system that was recent and underdeveloped.

Probable cause

The following findings were identified: - Firstly, by the LOC controller’s erroneous perception of the position of the aircraft, this being reinforced by the context and the working methods, which led him to clear the Shorts to line up, - Secondly, by the inadequacy of systematic verification procedures in ATC which made it impossible for the error to be corrected, - Finally, by the Shorts’ crew not dispelling any doubts they had as to the position of the 'number one' aircraft before entering the runway. Contributory factors include: - Light pollution in the area of runway 27, which made a direct view difficult for the LOC controller, - Difficulty for the LOC controller in accessing radar information: the ASTRE image was difficult to read and the AVISO image not displayed at his control position, - The use of two languages for radio communications, which meant that the Shorts crew were not conscious that the MD 83 was going to take off, - The angle between access taxiway 16 and the runway which made it impossible for the Shorts crew to perform a visual check before entering the runway, - The lack of coordination between the SOL and LOC controllers when managing the Shorts, exacerbated by the presence of a third party whose role was not defined, - A feedback system which was recent and still underdeveloped.