No fatalities

2001-02-04: Short 360 (EI-BPD) — Aer Arann — Sheffield, United Kingdom

Sheffield, United KingdomLanding (descent or approach)

On February 4, 2001, a Short 360 (registration EI-BPD) operated by Aer Arann was involved in an aviation accident near Sheffield, United Kingdom during landing or approach. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Evidence from the CVR indicated that the flight was conducted in a thoroughly professional manner in accordance the operator's normal procedures until the final stages of the approach. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 3 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781202901Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered EI-BPD
Aircraft registered EI-BPD. Photo: Ardfern / CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

A scheduled passenger flight from Dublin to Sheffield experienced a hard landing with multiple bounces after the handling pilot possibly inadvertently selected ground fine propeller pitch while airborne.

Approach and Initial Descent

The flight departed Dublin at 1814 hrs for Sheffield. The crew obtained ATIS 'Information Hotel' (1820 hrs) reporting surface wind variable 3 kt, visibility 4000 m in rain and snow, scattered clouds at 1200 ft, broken at 3000 ft, temperature/dew point +1°C, QNH 989 hPa. Descent was initiated, and at 10 nm from the airport, the crew received updated ATIS 'Information India' with no significant changes. The aircraft was cleared for the ILS/DME approach to Runway 28. Decision height was 400 ft.

Final Approach

During the ILS approach, the commander's flight director warning flag briefly appeared but did not recur. De-ice boots, selected on during initial descent due to light icing, were turned off at 5 nm when OAT was +5°C (actual +2°C). At 1918:11 hrs the crew reported established on the localiser. Flaps were set to 15° upon glidepath interception. The handling pilot noted a slightly higher descent rate initially, suspecting a tailwind, but it normalised by 4 nm. Propellers were set to maximum rpm at 1200 ft agl. Cleared to land inside 4 nm, the crew was advised wind variable 2 kt and wet runway. Both pilots saw runway lights near 400 ft; flaps were selected to 30°.

Landing and Aftermath

Both pilots believed airspeed was satisfactory, but as the commander checked back on the control column, the rate of descent increased noticeably, resulting in a firm landing. Two witnesses (tower controller and terminal witness) saw the aircraft at about 400 ft, appearing faster than normal. They observed a hard impact with left wing low, a loud noise, then a bounce, a nose-wheel-first second impact, and another bounce. Flight data indicate the aircraft lifted no more than 8 ft before settling on the runway. It travelled halfway, slewed left, and came to rest on grass with the left wing tip touching. The tower controller activated fire and rescue services; all passengers evacuated by 1925 hrs.

Investigation Findings

The CVR indicated professional conduct until the final approach. Three seconds before touchdown, propeller blade angles changed from flight to ground range, coincident with sounds of 'disking' and a deceleration/vertical acceleration. Engineering confirmed proper propeller control rigging. Selection of ground fine requires releasing a flight idle baulk and moving propeller levers further back, a motor skill in daily operations. It is possible the handling pilot unintentionally selected ground fine while airborne.

Probable cause

Evidence from the CVR indicated that the flight was conducted in a thoroughly professional manner in accordance the operator's normal procedures until the final stages of the approach. The recorded data indicate that three seconds prior to touchdown the propeller blade angle changed from the flight range to the ground range. Coincident with this change the CVR recorded sounds consistent with the propellers 'disking' and the FDR indicated that the aircraft then decelerated longitudinally and accelerated downwards. The engineering investigation revealed that the propeller control rigging and the operation of the flight idle baulk were correct. Selection of ground fine requires the pilot to firstly release the flight idle baulk and then lift and pull the propeller levers further back, this combined action rapidly becomes a programmed motor skill in the routine of daily operations. It is therefore possible that the handling pilot unintentionally selected the propellers into the ground fine position whilst still in the air.