2013 Havre Octeville runway excursion involving a Robin DR400-120 (F-GSBE)

Flight and accident sequence On 14 July 2013 at about 15:40 local time, a Robin DR400-120 registered F-GSBE, operated by a club for personal convenience, was on a VFR flight from Saint-André-de-l’Eure to Le Havre Octeville, with a planned overflight of the Bay of Seine and return to the departure aerodrome. The aircraft carried a pilot and two passengers. After listening to the ATIS and contacting the Le Havre tower, the pilot joined the downwind for runway 04. The controller cleared the aircraft to land and reported wind 330 degrees at 10 kt. The pilot reported turbulence and increased the landing speed to 140 km/h, extending the flaps to the landing position. According to the pilot, after touchdown and the start of braking, the aircraft turned sharply to the left and departed the runway laterally. The pilot stated that the aircraft avoided three rows of hay bales before the right wing struck another bale. The aircraft came to rest in the cleared area. ## Aerodrome and obstacle management Runway 04/22 at Le Havre Octeville is a paved runway measuring 2,300 by 40 m, with a 150 m cleared area on each side of the runway axis. The cleared area is intended to reduce the risk of material damage in the event of a runway excursion and to protect aircraft overflying the area during takeoff or landing. At the time of the accident, the protocol between the aerodrome operator and the air navigation service (SNA) required that round bales be stored outside the cleared area and critical areas, but it did not specify time limits for moving hay bales. In May 2000, the civil aviation authority had reminded the aerodrome operator and agricultural operators responsible for mowing critical areas that hay bales had to be stored at least 150 m from the runway edge once production was complete. The agricultural operator, responsible for mowing since 1981, stated that he was aware of the need to keep the cleared area free of obstacles. He said that during the July 2013 mowing period, weather conditions and technical problems forced him to make all the bales at once (about 1,400) and delayed their removal by several days. He added that no request to move the bales had been made by the aerodrome operator or the SNA. ## Air navigation service and oversight The presence of hay bales in the cleared area was mentioned only in the Le Havre ATIS; no NOTAM existed on the subject. On the date of the accident, the bales had been present for more than five days. The SNA had not asked the aerodrome operator to ensure that the bales in the cleared area were moved without delay. In its oversight activities, the DSAC checks the content of protocols signed between an aerodrome operator and third-party subcontractors, including agricultural operators. The absence of precise instructions on mowing in the protocol in force at the time of the accident had not been identified by DSAC surveillance inspectors. ## Findings and conclusion The safety investigation was unable to establish with certainty the causes of the lateral runway excursion. Asymmetric braking associated with the high speed chosen by the pilot could explain the circumstances. The aircraft damage resulted from the collision with a hay bale located in the cleared area. The investigation showed that the following factors may have contributed to the prolonged presence of obstacles in the cleared area: weather and operational constraints that did not always allow the agricultural operator to move the hay bales immediately; and underestimation by the aerodrome operator and the SNA of the risk posed by the presence of these obstacles in the cleared area in the event of a runway excursion. The presence of obstacles in a cleared area represents a significant risk to aircraft. When constraints prevent this risk from being mitigated as soon as possible, the decision to close the runway should be considered.