What happened
On March 9, 2014, an Airbus A321-111, registered as HB-IOC, was operating a scheduled flight from Zurich to Geneva. During the approach to runway 05, the flying pilot opted to fly the aircraft without the use of autopilot or autothrust.
Upon touchdown, the pilot experienced an unusually heavy landing and perceived that the aircraft had briefly bounced. Believing a bounce had occurred, the pilot initiated a go-around. During this maneuver, the pilot applied a sudden and forceful aft movement to the sidestick, pulling it to the full rear stop. This aggressive pitch-up caused the rear fuselage of the aircraft to strike the runway, resulting in structural damage.
Following the incident, the crew performed a second approach using radar vectors, which concluded without further issue. The tailstrike was observed by ground personnel, though the crew was not immediately notified of the specific observation by air traffic control.
The investigation
The SUST investigation examined the flight data, cockpit voice recordings, and technical aspects of the aircraft's flight control systems. The inquiry focused on the crew's actions during the transition from landing to go-around and the communication between air traffic services and the flight crew. Investigators also reviewed the aircraft's maintenance status, noting that specific software modifications designed to mitigate tailstrike risks had not been implemented on this particular airframe.
Findings
- The primary cause of the tailstrike was the abrupt application of aft sidestick input to the full stop by the pilot in command during the go-around.
- The pilot's limited experience led to the misinterpretation of the heavy touchdown as a bounced landing.
- A lack of tactile feedback between the two sidesticks prevented the monitoring pilot from identifying the sudden, aggressive movement of the flying pilot's controls in a timely manner.
- The flight crew failed to recognize that the aircraft had reached an excessive longitudinal pitch angle.
- Air traffic control failed to directly inform the crew that a tailstrike had been visually observed, instead asking the crew if they believed a strike had occurred, which led the crew to deny the event.
Safety action
Following the investigation, the operator implemented changes to simulator training. New exercises were integrated into both recurrent training and cross-crew qualification courses, specifically focusing on "balked landings" (go-arounds) to better prepare crews for the complexities of managing aircraft pitch during such maneuvers.