History
On 31 October 2004, an Emirates Airbus A330-243, registration A6-EKU, operating as flight UAE 87, was on a scheduled flight from Dubai to Zurich. The copilot was pilot flying and the commander was pilot not flying. At 11:03:41 UTC, the crew contacted Zurich approach control (Approach East – APE), which guided the aircraft onto the final approach to runway 14. During the approach, the air traffic control officer (ATCO) twice ordered speed restrictions, first to 200 knots or less at 11:09:42 UTC and then to 180 knots or less at 11:11:05 UTC. At 11:12:03 UTC, the APE ATCO instructed UAE 87 to descend to 4000 ft and turn left onto heading 180° with subsequent clearance for an ILS approach. The aircraft subsequently intersected the approach line, passed through the localizer plane, and drifted about ¼ NM to the west.
Meanwhile, a Swiss International Air Lines AVRO 146-RJ100, registration HB-IXU, operating as flight SWR 162C, was holding at runway 10. Just before UAE 87 touched down, the aerodrome controller issued a take-off clearance to SWR 162C from runway 10. However, UAE 87 encountered turbulence caused by north-easterly wind immediately before landing, leading to an unstabilised final approach. The crew of UAE 87 decided to go around shortly before touchdown.
After the air traffic control unit noticed the go-around by UAE 87, SWR 162C was instructed to reject its take-off in order to avoid convergence of the two aircraft on their extended runway centrelines. SWR 162C rejected its take-off after the second instruction from the air traffic control unit, shortly before reaching decision speed V1. UAE 87 followed the published missed approach procedure and landed approximately 15 minutes later on runway 14 in Zurich.
Investigation
The Swiss Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) was informed by REGA and opened an investigation the same day. The investigation examined the sequence of events, air traffic control procedures, and human factors. The report concluded that the incident was attributable to two causes: first, the aerodrome controller issued a take-off clearance to traffic on runway 10 before the aircraft approaching runway 14 had landed; second, the air navigation services company had conceived and applied a procedure which was incomplete and difficult to apply.
Damage
The source does not specify any damage to either aircraft beyond stating that damage was recorded separately for each aircraft in the factual information section. No further details are available in the provided source.
Causes
The incident is attributable to the fact that:
- the aerodrome controller issued a take-off clearance to a traffic on runway 10 before the aircraft approaching runway 14 had landed;
- the air navigation services company had conceived and applied a procedure which was incomplete and difficult to apply.