Incident Overview
On May 15, 1986, MALEV Airlines Flight MA566, operating a Tupolev TU-134 with registration HA-LBH, arrived at Zurich Airport from Budapest. The aircraft was on a scheduled commercial route when it encountered a significant error during the final approach phase. The incident occurred on runway 14, resulting in minor damage to the aircraft and airport infrastructure, but no fatalities or serious injuries were reported among the seven crew members and seventeen passengers.
Approach Error and Sequence of Events
The flight crew initiated a VOR/DME approach for runway 14 after the Instrument Landing System (ILS) was taken out of service for maintenance on April 21, 1986. During the final phase, the pilots visually confirmed they were aligned with what they believed to be runway 14. However, they had actually established themselves on the approach path for runway 16. The commander realized the error approximately 23 to 24 seconds before touchdown, at a distance of about two nautical miles from the KLO DME. He took control from the co-pilot and initiated a correction maneuver toward runway 14.
Impact and Damage
The aircraft touched down roughly 500 meters past the threshold of runway 14 with a lateral deviation of approximately six degrees to the left relative to the runway axis. During the subsequent directional correction, the left main landing gear struck two light beacons on the left edge of the runway. The braking system on the left main gear was damaged, and the two airport lights were destroyed. The aircraft remained airworthy, and all personnel exited without serious injury.
Investigation Findings and Recommendations
The Swiss Federal Accident Investigation Commission determined that the root cause was an approach to the wrong runway due to a critical VOR/DME procedure. The published approach path for runway 14 led directly over the threshold of runway 16, creating a high risk of confusion. Additionally, the crew verified the assigned runway too late and failed to execute a go-around after realizing the error. The investigation recommended reviewing the discontinuation of this specific VOR/DME procedure in favor of more precise ILS approaches where available, prioritizing safety over operational convenience.