Casualties unknown

2008-07-30: AIRBUS A319-132 (D-ABGC) — Zürich Flughafen (LSZH), ZH, CH

Zürich Flughafen (LSZH), ZH, CH

On July 30, 2008, an AIRBUS A319-132 (registration D-ABGC) was involved in an aviation accident near Zürich Flughafen (LSZH), ZH, CH. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The near-collision was caused by a breakdown in situational awareness during a controller shift handover, where the incoming controller was not adequately informed of an arriving aircraft, and the outgoing controller failed to properly monitor the… This summary draws on records from the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST).

Sourcesthe Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST)Primary reportUpdated 1785034239Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered D-ABGC
Aircraft registered D-ABGC. Photo: Aero Icarus from Zürich, Switzerland / CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

An Airbus A319 was forced to abort its takeoff at Zurich Airport after an arriving Fairchild Metroliner approached the intersecting runway.

What happened

On July 31, 2008, a near-collision occurred at Zurich Airport involving two aircraft on intersecting runways 16 and 28. An OLT-operated Fairchild SA227AC Metroliner III, registration D-COLB, was conducting an IFR flight from Bremen to Zurich. The crew requested an approach to runway 16, which was an alternative to the active runway 14. After receiving clearance and completing the landing, the Metroliner proceeded to taxi across runway 28.

Simultaneously, an Air Berlin Airbus A319, registration D-ABGC, was positioned at the holding point for runway 28, preparing for a flight to Düsseldorf. After receiving takeoff clearance, the Airbus accelerated to a speed of approximately 65-70 knots. During this roll, the departing controller noticed the Metroliner approaching the intersection and immediately ordered the Airbus to abort the takeoff. The crew of the Airbus A3 and19 responded by applying manual brakes, bringing the aircraft to a halt between taxiways Kilo and Juliet.

The investigation

The investigation focused on the coordination between the Approach and Aerodrome Control (ADC) during a shift handover. The outgoing controller (FVL1) had cleared the Fairchild SA227AC Metroliner III to land on runway 16 and subsequently issued the takeoff clearance for the Airbus A319 on runway 28. During the briefing for the handover to the incoming controller (FVL2), the outgoing controller's attention was diverted by coordinating a helicopter photo mission in the control zone.

Investigators examined the use of the Tower Approach Communication System (TACO) and radar monitoring. While the radar was functional, the controller primarily relied on visual monitoring. The investigation also reviewed the handover procedures, noting that the incoming controller was not specifically alerted to the presence of the arriving Metroliner until the outgoing controller noticed the aircraft on the runway and alerted him.

Findings

  • The primary cause of the incident was the lack of effective monitoring and communication during the controller handover process.
  • The outgoing controller failed to mark the arriving Fairchild SA227AC Metroliner III on the TACO system.
  • The incoming controller was preoccupied with coordinating a helicopter mission and was not briefed on the specific arrival on runway 16.
  • The small size of the Metroliner made it difficult to detect visually during the period of high workload and distraction.
  • The takeoff clearance for the Airbus A319 was issued without a confirmed scan of the intersecting runway 16 by the outgoing controller.

Probable cause

The near-collision was caused by a breakdown in situational awareness during a controller shift handover, where the incoming controller was not adequately informed of an arriving aircraft, and the outgoing controller failed to properly monitor the intersection or utilize electronic marking tools.

Investigation report by the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST). Original record: https://www.sust.admin.ch/inhalte/AV-berichte/2047_d.pdf. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB), Switzerland.