Background
The flight crew held proper licenses and certifications. The pilot had approximately 2,240 total flight hours, with 1,930 hours on the SA226-TC. The co-pilot obtained his commercial pilot license in 1988 and accumulated about 500 total hours. He completed his instrument rating on 15 December 1996 and initial training on the SA226-TC in March 1997 in British Columbia with a different company. His recurrent training was completed on 09 June 1997 after 44 days without flying. The accident flight was the co-pilot's third day of operational flying for the company, with approximately 55 hours on type.
Flight and Approach
The co-pilot was flying a radar-vectored localizer/back-course approach to runway 25 at Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier airport. While descending through 10,000 feet above sea level, the crew performed an approach briefing. Weather conditions did not require a full instrument briefing as visual conditions were expected. Air traffic control requested a speed of 180 knots or better to the Ottawa non-directional beacon (NDB), which served as the final approach fix (FAF). At about eight nautical miles from the airport, the aircraft exited cloud and the crew could see the runway.
To simulate instrument conditions, the pilot (also the company training pilot) placed a map against the co-pilot's windscreen. The approach briefing was not updated to reflect this simulation. The co-pilot accurately flew the localizer to the FAF, then reduced speed to approximately 140 knots and requested flap 2, which the pilot set. After passing the FAF, the co-pilot's workload increased and he struggled with the simulated approach.
Landing and Aftermath
On short final, the pilot removed the map. The co-pilot noticed the aircraft was faster and higher than normal and attempted to correct. At the runway 25 threshold, the aircraft was about 500 feet above ground at relatively high speed; the pilot took control for landing. He tried to descend and slow the aircraft down the 8,000-foot runway, stating he had just initiated an overshoot when he heard the first impact sounds. The first propeller marks appeared about 4,590 feet from the threshold. The aircraft came to rest approximately 6,770 feet from the threshold, and a fire erupted in the right engine area. The co-pilot opened the main door and the pilot shut down systems; both exited uninjured.
Crew Actions and Procedures
The maximum speed for landing gear extension was 176 knots. Company standard operating procedures (SOPs) for a normal instrument approach specified crossing the FAF at 140 knots with 2 flap and landing gear down. SOPs required all checklist items to be actioned via challenge and response. The first item of the before landing checks was landing gear down with three green lights. The co-pilot did not recall being challenged for the gear check, and the pilot could not remember selecting the gear down. Neither pilot verified the three green lights. The pilot stated he habitually checked the landing lights as a proxy for gear down because he turned them on only after gear extension; he remembered seeing the landing lights on and thus believed the gear was down. The co-pilot assumed the before landing checks were completed since the aircraft had passed the NDB, where they were normally performed. Neither pilot recalled hearing a gear warning horn.
Systems Examination
Inspection revealed the landing gear selector was in the up position. Tests of the landing gear warning system showed the gear warning horn was inoperative due to a faulty diode. After replacing the diode, the system functioned properly. The pilot stated that the horn had worked during training with the co-pilot one week earlier.
Probable Cause
The aircraft was landed with the landing gear retracted because the flight crew did not follow the standard operating procedures and extend the landing gear. Contributing to the occurrence were the lack of planning, coordination, and communication on the part of the crew; and the failure of the landing gear warning system.