What happened
On September 17, 2023, at 16:23 UTC, a Boeing 737-800, registration TC-JHT, operated by Turkish Airlines, was performing a scheduled passenger flight from Istanbul to Denizli Çardak Airport. The flight was carrying 151 passengers and five crew members.
During the approach to runway 05, the crew was informed that a hook barrier was present at the runway threshold. The pilot flying (PF), the second pilot, had no prior experience landing on a runway equipped with a hook barrier. As the aircraft crossed the threshold, the crew attempted to adjust the descent rate and thrust to land behind the barrier. The aircraft experienced an initial touchdown with a vertical acceleration of 1.85g, causing the aircraft to bounce.
Following the first impact, both pilots simultaneously manipulated the thrust levers and controls, leading to a loss of effective task sharing. The captain, acting as the pilot monitoring (PM), increased thrust without a specific callout. The subsequent second impact was significantly harder, measuring 2.95g. During the subsequent go-around attempt, the aircraft reached a maximum pitch angle of 9.3 degrees. Due to insufficient thrust and an excessive pitch attitude, the tail and lower fuselage made contact with the runway surface. There were no injuries to passengers or crew, though the aircraft sustained light damage to the tail cone and skin.
The investigation
The UEİM investigation examined flight data recorder (FDR) and flight data monitoring (FDM) parameters, including vertical acceleration, pitch angles, and engine N1 values. The investigation also reviewed the crew's training records, the aircraft's maintenance history, and the meteorological conditions at the time of the event. The investigators analyzed the cockpit communication and the breakdown of sterile cockpit procedures during the approach.
Findings
- The second pilot, serving as the pilot flying, had no previous experience landing on a runway with a hook barrier.
- The sterile cockpit environment was compromised due to excessive communication during the approach, which reduced situational awareness.
- Improper task sharing and control inputs occurred when both pilots simultaneously manipulated the thrust levers and flight controls during the first bounce.
- The captain increased thrust without a formal callout while in the PM role.
- During the go-around, the pilot monitoring failed to call out the excessive pitch angle, which had exceeded the 7.5-degree threshold specified in the FCOM.
- The combination of low N1 thrust levels and a high pitch angle of 9.3 degrees directly resulted in the tail strike.