Incident Overview
On 5 February 2024, at 0436 hours local time, a runway incursion occurred on Runway 02C at Singapore Changi Airport. The incident involved two Boeing 787-9 aircraft: Aircraft A (registration HL7209, operated by Korean Airlines) and Aircraft B (registration 9V-OJH, operated by Scoot). The Transport Safety Investigation Bureau of Singapore classified the occurrence as an incident.
Sequence of Events
Aircraft A landed on Runway 02C at 0435 hours. The Runway Controller (RWC) instructed Aircraft A to vacate via Rapid Exit Taxiway (RET) T6 and turn left onto Taxiway T. After Aircraft A taxied onto RET T6 and established contact with the Ground Movement Controller (GMC), the RWC issued a landing clearance to Aircraft B, which was approximately 2 nautical miles from the runway threshold. The RWC anticipated that Aircraft A would soon vacate onto Taxiway T.
At 0436:37 hours, the RWC and GMC observed that Aircraft A had stopped on RET T6 near the runway holding position marking for Exit B. According to the Pilot Flying of Aircraft A, the aircraft stopped after the Pilot Monitoring called for a stop due to insufficient clearance to turn into Exit A. At that moment, Aircraft B was over the runway threshold. The RWC did not cancel the landing clearance or instruct a go-around, considering that the tail of Aircraft A was clear of the runway and that a go-around would be risky at that critical phase. Aircraft B landed and vacated via RET T4. Aircraft A later vacated via Exit B after coordination with the GMC.
Personnel and Environmental Information
The Pilot-in-Command of Aircraft A was 54 years old with an Airline Transport Pilot Licence, and the First Officer was 32 with a Commercial Pilot Licence. The RWC was 31 with 3.5 years of experience, and the GMC was 31 with 7 years of experience. The incident occurred during nighttime hours with no precipitation and visibility of 10 kilometers.
Investigation Findings
The investigation focused on the RWC's issuance of landing clearance and decision not to cancel it. The Air Traffic Services Manual required that a landing aircraft not cross the threshold until all preceding aircraft are clear of the runway. However, the RWC believed it safer for Aircraft B to continue landing. There was no injury to persons and no damage to either aircraft.
Safety Actions and Recommendations
Following the incident, the air traffic services provider and the aerodrome operator implemented safety actions, including reviewing procedures and enhancing awareness. Specific safety recommendations were made to prevent recurrence.