6 fatalities

Aircraft Crash at Samara-Kurumoch Airport in Freezing Fog (RA-65021)

Samara-Kurumoch, RussiaLanding (descent or approach)

On March 17, 2007, a Tupolev TU-134 (registration RA-65021) operated by UTAir was involved in an aviation accident near Samara-Kurumoch, Russia during landing or approach. 6 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The decision of the crew to continue the descent below MDA in below minimums weather conditions until the aircraft impacted ground and crashed. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A).

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-11Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered RA-65021
Aircraft registered RA-65021. Photo: Pavel Adzhigildaev / CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

A plane crashed 304 m from the runway threshold at Samara-Kurumoch Airport in freezing fog, killing six passengers. The crew continued below minimums despite poor visibility.

Flight Details and Accident Sequence The aircraft departed Surgut for Belgorod with an intermediate stop at Samara, carrying 50 passengers and 7 crew members. During descent to Samara-Kurumoch Airport, weather deteriorated and visibility fell below minimums. After completing the approach checklist, the crew lowered the landing gear, selected 30° flaps, and continued the approach. In poor visibility, the aircraft descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) and struck the ground at 320 km/h, 304 metres from the runway threshold and 95 metres left of the extended centerline. The aircraft came to rest upside down and partially burned. ## Casualties and Conditions Six passengers were killed, 21 other occupants were injured, and 30 people escaped uninjured. At the time of the accident, visibility was estimated at 150 metres, with a runway visual range (RVR) of 200 metres for runway 23 and a vertical visibility of 300 feet in freezing fog. ## Official Findings The official probable cause was the crew’s decision to continue the descent below MDA in below-minimums weather until impact. Contributing factors included organizational, technical, and procedural deficiencies among the meteorological office, air traffic control (ATC), and the crew; deficiencies in Samara Airport standards and technical documentation that prevented timely ATC notification of KRAMS-4 weather-station readings showing deterioration below airport minimums; the flight crew’s failure to initiate a go-around at decision height without reliable visual contact with approach lights and the airport environment; ATC’s failure to fully use radar equipment due to contradictions in standards and procedures; poor crew coordination and delayed execution of a missed approach; and the lack of unified federal regulations covering flight operations, ATC, meteorological, and other services, incorporating domestic and international flight-safety experience.