Accident Overview
On 31 January 2017, at 19:18:31 local time, an F-16C (tail number 88-0496) assigned to the 311th Fighter Squadron at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, fired 155 20mm training projectile bullets at a Joint Terminal Attack Controllers' (JTAC) position on the Red Rio bombing range within the White Sands Missile Range. The attack resulted in injuries to one military member and the death of a civilian contractor.
Sequence of Events
The mishap pilot (MP), a USAF First Lieutenant with 86 total flying hours (60.9 in the F-16), was flying his first night close-air support (CAS) training sortie. He was under the supervision of a mishap instructor pilot (MIP), a USAF Captain with 887 total flying hours (857 in the F-16) and 107 instructor pilot hours. The MP's aircraft was equipped with a LITENING Gen4 SE targeting pod and carried a 500-pound inert laser-guided bomb and 210 rounds of 20mm training projectiles. The MIP flew an F-16D with a similar configuration.
The sortie included a bomb pass and two unsuccessful strafing attempts. The MIP then directed the MP to perform an infrared pointer-aided strafe on a simulated SA-8 training target site located 900 meters from the ground element. The MIP did not verify that the MP had identified the intended target or the ground element's location. During the final strafing pass, the MP disregarded his onboard sensor information and aimed at the observation point (OP) where the ground element was positioned, firing his gun.
Personnel and Injuries
The civilian contractor (MC) was a retired USAF Master Sergeant and former JTAC, present to demonstrate short-wave infrared technology. He was equipped with Level 3 body armor and a Kevlar helmet but was not wearing them at the time of the incident. A 20mm training projectile fragment struck him in the back of the head. A UH-60 aircrew extracted him, provided urgent care, and transported him to Alamogordo, New Mexico, where he died at 21:01 local time. One military member also sustained injuries.
Cause
The Accident Investigation Board President determined, by a preponderance of evidence, that the cause of the mishap was pilot error. The MP misperceived the ground element's location as the intended target, misinterpreted his instruments, and failed to follow his onboard systems that were directing him to the proper target. The MIP's failed supervision and instruction were found to have substantially contributed to the mishap, including inadequate cross-monitoring, task misprioritization, overconfidence, complacency, and overaggressiveness.