Accident Summary
On 6 November 2019, at 0937 Zulu time, an F-16CM aircraft, tail number 90-816, assigned to the 14th Fighter Squadron, 35th Fighter Wing, Misawa Air Base, Japan, released an inert GBU-12 bomb that impacted the ground outside of Draughon Range, a U.S. Government-administered bombing range approximately 15 miles north of Misawa Air Base. The bomb impacted private property near the northern edge of Lake Ogawara. There were no deaths or injuries, and no damage to government property or private structures.
Sequence of Events
The aircraft was flying with six other aircraft on a night Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Flight Lead Upgrade sortie. At a mass mission brief, the mishap pilot was informed that his aircraft would carry an inert GBU-12 and that if the mission and weather allowed, he should employ the weapon during the sortie. He discussed range restrictions and planned attack with his wingman, but later learned he would be flying as a single ship. He departed as a single ship at approximately 0840Z.
During the sortie, the pilot tried twice to drop the weapon on the tactical target at the range but was unable due to a scattered layer of clouds that obscured the target. After the vulnerability period ended and primary training was complete, he elected to make another attempt. At around 0934Z, he requested assistance from another two-ship flight with call signs Shinzo 1 and 2. Based on observed weather over the range, he concluded that if Shinzo flight could guide his GBU-12 in, he could safely drop. Shinzo 1 and 2 visually acquired the target and informed the pilot they could guide his weapon.
While on his attack run, the pilot asked Shinzo 1 to transmit its Sensor Point of Interest (SPI), which was located on the tactical target. At around 0935Z, Shinzo 1 communicated that he was transmitting the SPI. The pilot selected symbology that he believed corresponded to Shinzo 1's SPI; however, the SPI he selected was approximately 3.4 miles from the correct target. The pilot communicated that he had “captured” Shinzo 1's SPI and continued his attack run. Shinzo 1 acknowledged, but both failed to confirm that the SPI sent by Shinzo 1 was the SPI received in the mishap aircraft. At approximately 0937Z, believing he had the correct SPI, the pilot dropped his weapon when his system gave a release cue. The GBU-12 flew its ballistic computed flight path to the incorrect SPI.
Cause and Contributing Factors
The Accident Investigation Board President determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cause of the mishap was pilot error. He concluded that a failure of communication during an assisted weapons deployment procedure caused the mishap pilot to fail to confirm that the SPI he had selected was the target to which the other formation was guiding the weapon. Substantially contributing factors include channelized attention, changing weather, and targeting technical error.