What happened
On February 2, 2013, at 19:32 UTC, an ATR 72-212A, registration YR-ATS, was performing flight AZ1670 from Pisa to Rome Fiumicino with 46 passengers and 4 crew members on board. During the landing on runway 16L, the aircraft made an initial contact with the runway approximately 560 meters from the threshold. Following this, the aircraft experienced three subsequent impacts with the runway surface, during which the nose gear and subsequently the main landing gear collapsed.
After the final impact, the aircraft slid on its fuselage for approximately 400 meters, deviating to the right of the runway. The aircraft eventually came to a halt on the grass verge near taxiway "DE", approximately 1,800 meters from the runway threshold. The aircraft sustained significant structural damage, and several occupants were transported to medical facilities for treatment.
The investigation
The ANSV investigation examined the flight data from the FDR and cockpit voice recordings from the CVR. The analysis focused on the flight crew's performance, the aircraft's mechanical state, and the environmental conditions at the time of the accident. The investigation also reviewed the effectiveness of the airport's emergency response and the communication between the control tower and fire services.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was improper aircraft handling by the pilot flying (the commander) during the landing phase. The pilot's actions were inconsistent with the operator's manual and occurred during a period of significant environmental difficulty, specifically crosswind values that were at the limit or exceeding the allowable limits for the ATR 72-212A.
- The pilot flying maintained an approach speed (VAPP) significantly higher than the prescribed value.
- A lack of effective Crew Resource Management (CRM) was noted; the significant experience gap between the commander and the first officer inhibited the junior officer from exercising critical oversight.
- The crew failed to conduct a landing briefing prior to the approach, which would have established shared situational awareness.
- The commander's high level of experience led to an overconfidence in the ability to land safely despite the critical wind conditions.
- During the emergency response, communications between the Tower and the fire services were not fully effective, and the airport's GRID-MAP was not utilized to pinpoint the aircraft's location.
Safety action
Following the investigation, the ANSV issued recommendations to ENAC and the National Fire Corps to improve training regarding aeronautical terminology and airport layouts to ensure more effective emergency responses. Additionally, a recommendation was made to ensure that Air Traffic Control towers use GRID-MAP references when activating emergency services to facilitate the rapid location of distressed aircraft.