Pilot reported a near miss while turning right base when another aircraft turned left base for the same runway. Reporter executed a go-around and the other aircraft took evasive action to avoid a collision.

Narrative

On Date; Pilot #1 (reporting Pilot) experienced a near-miss event when turning right base for Runway XX at ZZZ Airport. Meteorological conditions were excellent; basically clear and unlimited visibility. The chain of events are as follows: Pilot #1 was flying recreationally from ZZZ1 to ZZZ; and knew that prevailing winds were 7-10 knots from 100° by listening to the ASOS; thus knew Runway XX would be in use and joined the pattern RIGHT downwind for XX.Pilot #2 was a beginning student pilot accompanied by an instructor. Aircraft Y was mid-flight in a X:XY hour training mission with a beginning student pilot left seat who was also operating the radio on the Unicom frequency for ZZZ. The aircraft was a Cessna 172K.Prior to approaching the airport; Aircraft Y had flown nearly to the Coast south of ZZZ; executed a series of 360° turns and approached ZZZ from LEFT downwind and executed a series of three touch and goes and balked landings from the EAST side of the airport (LEFT pattern).When joining the pattern RIGHT midfield downwind for 17 Pilot #1 first heard the student pilot announce that they were LEFT downwind XX. This was the first radio communication that Pilot #1 heard. Pilot #1 announced on the Unicom to Aircraft Y that 'Runway 17 was RIGHT pattern'; at which point the instructor keyed the radio and said; 'he wanted to try something ... '. The student pilot had been the primary radio operator up to this point; and as is frequently the case with student pilots; the student's radio work was lacking in both crispness and accuracy.Pilot #1 proceeded RIGHT downwind for 17; turned RIGHT base for 17; and turned final for 17 when the instructor for Aircraft Y exclaimed; 'You cut us off!'. Words were exchanged on the radio and Pilot #1 proceeded to abort the landing on short final and executed a go-around.Aircraft Y executed an evasive action by performing a left 180 from an estimated heading of 260°; then performed a left 90° turn to 0° and proceeded to execute an extended LEFT downwind for XX; ultimately turning LEFT base and then final for XX while Aircraft X executed a go around. Aircraft Y landed. Pilot #1 successfully executed the go around; reentered the pattern RIGHT downwind and completed a successful landing on 17 and taxied back while Aircraft Y taxied and took off and then executed a series of RIGHT pattern maneuvers; with better radio communication on the part of the student pilot. All told Aircraft Y executed about 10 landings/go arounds/touch and goes; initially 5 from LEFT pattern; and after the incident 5 from RIGHT pattern.The problem arose due to lack of preparation and knowledge of pattern traffic on the part of the instructor in Aircraft Y. This lack of situational awareness on the part of the instructor and failure to research the airspace properly before and during the training flight in Aircraft Y and inaction to research the airspace around the airport (ZZZ) caused the incident to occur.Instructor showed clear lack of judgement on this flight; not just at ZZZ. Aircraft Y took off from ZZZ2 and initially executed a series of RIGHT 360s in a notorious aerial hot spot southwest of Road X and Hwy X; which lies between active runways at ZZZ3 and ZZZ4 at the western edge of the VFR tunnel between ZZZ5 and ZZZ6. Ask any Controller about this area and they will tell you this was terrible judgement. Pilot #1 was focused on pattern work and on executing the proper RIGHT base and final approach and missed seeing the other aircraft. Poor radio work on the part of the student pilot (failure to announce position and intent) also contributed to the incident.Factors affecting the quality of human performance include a number of human factors; including pilot fatigue from having flown from ZZZ7 to ZZZ2 after midnight the previous night; and overtraining the student pilot during accelerated beginner's instruction (too much too soon). The instructor also exhibited anger and denial after the incident; both signs of stress. Pilot #1's perception is that the student pilot was unaware of the poor judgement of her instructor. The poor student sounded like they wanted to cry when operating the Unicom after the incident; likely due to the imposed stress of the situation due to the instructor's lack of preparation and low quality of instruction.