ACR MLG TKOF WITHOUT COMPLETING BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. FLC HAD NOT RECEIVED WT AND BAL SO ACFT WAS NOT CORRECTLY CONFIGURED.

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TOLD TO FOLLOW 2 ACR Y LGTS FOR TKOF. LONG TAXI; ELECTED TO TAXI ON 1 ENG. AS WE NEARED DEP RWY; STARTED SECOND ENG. SHORTLY AFTER START; BOTH LGTS DIRECTED TO RUN UP BLOCK. WE WERE TOLD TO PASS UP AND CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. WE ENTERED RWY AND STARTED ROLLING TKOF. AFTER PWR SET; I LOOKED DOWN AT V SPD CHART TO VERIFY SPDS. REALIZED SPDS HAD NOT BEEN SET; THEN REALIZED BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST NOT COMPLETED. LOOKED AT ACARS FOR WT. NOT THERE; NOT EVER RECEIVED. HAVING ROUGH IDEA OF WT; USED SPD 10 KTS FASTER AND CONTINUED TKOF. DO NOT ALLOW YOURSELF TO BE RUSHED; EVER! SHOULD NOT HAVE PUSHED BACK WITHOUT WT AND BAL DATA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 188951: AS I SWITCHED TO THE TWR FREQ THE MASTER CAUTION ILLUMINATED WITH THE 'OVERHEAD' ON THE RECALL ANNUNCIATOR. LOOKING TO THE OVERHEAD I FIRST NOTICED THE B SYS ELECTRIC HYD PUMP CAUTION ILLUMINATED WITH THE SWITCH IN THE ON POS. B SYS QUANTITY AND PRESSURE WERE FULL AND STEADY. LOOKING BACK TO THE OVERHEAD I FOUND THAT THE L GENERATOR HAD FALLEN OFF THE LINE; AND BROUGHT IT TO THE CAPT'S ATTN. THE CAPT ADVANCED THE PWR LEVERS AND ENGAGED THE AUTO THROTTLES. THE ENG PWR WENT TO FULL TKOF THRUST; AND THE CAPT COMMENTED THAT NO REDUCTION HAD BEEN ENTERED IN THE FMS. THE CAPT AGAIN COMMENTED; AS WE BOTH REALIZED; 'WE DON'T HAVE THE WT AND BAL NUMBERS'. THE CAPT AND I ARE BOTH ADAMANT ABOUT CHKLIST USE. HAVING A FAMILIAR COCKPIT AND CHKLIST FLOW AS WELL AS A WORKING ROUTINE ALLOWED A SAFELY CONFIGURED TKOF. IT IS THE NONSTANDARD; THE LAST MIN DISTR; THE LAST LEG OF THE TRIP; GET HOME ON TIME; THE ALLOWING OURSELVES TO BE RUSHED THAT PUT US INTO A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS POS OF TKOF.