ACR MLG SPD DEV. FMS PROGRAMMING CONTRIBUTED TO THE ERROR.

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APPROX 110 NM SE OF ORD; ATC COMMENCED OUR DSCNT WITH THE KNOX 1 ARR. ANTICIPATING THE XING AND SPD RESTRICTIONS AT HALIE INTXN THE FMS WAS PROGRAMMED FOR A KNOX VOR XING OF 16000 FT AND A HALIE INTXN XING OF 11000 FT AND 250 KIAS. ULTIMATELY; THE KNOX XING WAS REMOVED AS FURTHER CLRNC REMOVED ITS APPLICABILITY. ATC ISSUED CLRNC TO MAINTAIN 300 KIAS WHICH WAS ACCOMPLISHED TO WITHIN APPROX 5 NM OF HALIE AT WHICH POINT THE ACFT WAS SLOWED TO 250 KIAS. THIS SPD WAS MAINTAINED XING HALIE AND UNTIL HDOF TO ORD APCH CTL. PASSING HALIE THE CTLR INQUIRED AS TO OUR SPD AND I REPLIED '250 KTS.' THE CTLR STATED; 'WEREN'T YOU GIVEN 300 KIAS TO MAINTAIN.' I REPLIED; 'WE SLOWED FOR THE HALIE INTXN SPD RESTRICTION.' NOTHING MORE WAS SAID UNTIL THE CTLR HANDED US OFF TO ORD APCH CTL WITH THE PARTING COMMENT OF 'THANKS FOR THE HELP.' THIS COMMENT CAUSED THIS RPT TO BE FILED; AFTER SOME INTERNAL SOUL- SEARCHING; INASMUCH AS THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME QUESTION IN THE MIND OF THE CTLR AS TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE SPD CHANGE. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH ORD APCH WE WERE SLOWED TO 210 KIAS AND CONTINUED TO LAND UNEVENTFULLY ON RWY 27L. IT IS UNKNOWN WHETHER; IN FACT; ATC HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE SPD REDUCTION OR NOT. THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME CONCERN; BUT NOT DYNAMICALLY STATED. HOWEVER; ON REFLECTION; IT APPEARED THAT THERE MIGHT BE SEVERAL CONCERNS ARISING OUT OF THIS INCIDENT. FIRST; THE 'GLASS COCKPIT' ENVIRONMENT IS PUSHING MORE AND MORE TOWARD AUTOMATING THE ENTIRE FLT AND THE CREWS ARE TO A GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT BEING LULLED INTO AN OPERATIONAL COMPLACENCY. HAD WE NOT PROGRAMMED THE FMS THE CHANCES OF THE SPD REDUCTION OCCURRING WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE BEEN REDUCED WITHOUT SOMEONE QUESTIONING WHAT WAS GOING ON. THIS DEPENDENCE ON AUTOMATION DOES 2 THINGS: 1) IT DEVELOPS A FALSE SENSE OF OPERATIONAL RELIANCE ON THE EQUIP TO DO THE JOB; AND 2) IT REDUCES SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OWING TO COMFORT WITH 1) ABOVE. SECOND; THOSE CREWS OPERATING A 'GLASS COCKPIT' ALMOST INVARIABLY WANT TO UTILIZE THE NEW EQUIP TO ITS FULLEST AND TO BECOME THAT MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE WITH THE NEW DEVICES AND TECHNIQUES. CONSEQUENTLY; IF THE CREW PROGRAMS THE FMS TO CARRY OUT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN AN ARR PROC; AS AN EXAMPLE; THE ROTE CARRYING OUT OF THIS PROC BY THE COMPUTER MAY DRAW THE CREW INTO INADVERTENT DEVS FROM PRIOR CLRNCS. THIRDLY; IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PORTRAYAL ON ARR AND APCH PROCS OF 'EXPECT CLRNC TO CROSS' PROCS MAY FURTHER DRAW THE 'GLASS' CREWMEMBER INTO THE TRAP. PERHAPS; A DIFFERENT METHOD OF PROVIDING THE CREWS WITH OPERATIONAL POTENTIALS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. THE RESTRICTIONS APPEARING ALONGSIDE THE RTE MAY BE INAPPROPRIATE AND SOME ATTN SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PLACING INFORMATIONAL DATA ELSEWHERE ON THE CHART.