Air carrier Captain reported the flight crew received two TCAS Resolution Advisories while on approach to SFO Runway 28L due to traffic on approach to the parallel runway. The flight crew completed a go-around; a second approach attempt; and landing. The Captain made several recommendations regarding parallel approach operations at SFO.

Narrative

I was Captain; pilot monitoring; on a VMC night visual approach to [Runway] 28L when we received a 'CLIMB' TCAS resolution advisory requiring a go-around. The intruding aircraft was on a parallel visual approach to 28R behind our right wing as indicated on our Navigation Display (ND) and not in sight at the time of the RA. The TCAS system was being operated in the TA/RA mode.The FO; pilot flying; was using the autopilot which intercepted the localizer from a shallow intercept angle without overshooting the runway extended centerline. The autopilot was tracking the localizer and glide slope at the time of the resolution advisory. The FO responded to the RA by disconnecting the autopilot and auto throttles and established a gentle climb. A 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' TCAS oral message was announced and we attempted to continue the approach but received a second 'CLIMB' RA. We then discontinued the approach; told Tower we were going around and complied with their climb out instructions. A second approach and landing was accomplished without incident. I do not recall being informed by ATC that the parallel; intruding aircraft had us in sight and maintaining visual separation.The crux of the problem is that Simultaneous Operations on Intersecting Runways (SOIR) while also conducting parallel approaches and departures to those same runways are being conducted at SFO in order to solve airport capacity problems. It is not within the scope of this report to address capacity issues so my comments are restricted to pilot and controller operations to address the systemic risks caused by SFO operations. Pilots should be trained to fly their aircraft in a manner that does not trigger TCAS warnings just as we fly so as to avoid triggering ground proximity warnings. Using the autopilot can reduce workload allowing for more attention to potential traffic conflicts. Shallow intercept angles to final will slow closure rate to parallel traffic and reduce potential warnings. The trailing aircraft should fly an airspeed that avoids excess closure rate with the preceding aircraft; avoids the abeam position and maintains nose-to-tail separation.ATC should be trained to use the latest available technology to offer services that avoid triggering TCAS warnings. It has come to my attention that often ATC facilities do not make use of ADS-B data for controlling aircraft. I can imagine a modernized air traffic control system providing tools needed by ATC. ADS-B transponders transmit elements such as position; ground speed and climb/descent rates five times per second. This very precise; timely data can produce accurate flight path vectors which can be programmed to coincide with the TCAS warning thresholds. A controller may then be able to assign more accurate airspeeds and headings that accomplish the objective without triggering a TCAS warning.A review of FOM regarding a TCAS RA is very clear and appropriate. The other guidance seems inconsistent with this. The guidance is excellent right up to the paragraph on page XX. This paragraph sounds like excuses to inhibit a mandated system right when we need it most. This guidance reminds me of the days when ground proximity warnings were habitually inhibited resulting in controlled flight into terrain. A better option would be to replace this paragraph with comments that support FOM. Avoid any options to inhibit TCAS warnings and instead include flying techniques that avoid triggering TCAS warnings. If an approach cannot be flown without triggering TCAS warnings; a go-around may be the best option. We do not inhibit ground proximity warnings nor ignore unstable approaches. Neither should we be inhibiting TCAS warnings to accommodate an airport capacity issue.