2022-06 · NASA ASRS report 1944382
Pilot reported cracks were discovered in the SR22 nose landing gear strut assembly during annual inspection. Pilot suggested the same problem may exist in other SR22 aircraft.
I am an instrument rated private pilot and own a Cirrus SR22T. During my recent annual on Day 0; a crack was found on the nose landing gear strut assembly (NLG) at the welds between the strut tube and the gusset tubes. This resulted in the grounding of my plane for four (4) months through Day 1; while awaiting a replacement part. When the replacement part was ordered; I was advised by Cirrus that my plane was one of sixty-seven planes awaiting this part which were also grounded because of cracks in the NLG. In addition; to these sixty-seven (67) grounded planes which were then experiencing this issue; I have learned that there have been dozens; if not hundreds of Cirrus SR20 and SR22's which have had NLG cracks and required replacement. This part has been the subject of a number of Service and Advisory Bulletins beginning in 2016 and earlier. Although to the best of my knowledge none of the sixty-six (66) other Cirrus planes awaiting this part when my part was ordered; or the dozens or more which have had cracks identified in NLGs were involved in any incidents or accidents resulting in the collapse of the NLG; there was one incident involving a NLG on a Cirrus SR22 investigated by the NTSB [in which it was discovered that high-stress fatigue lead to a fracture through the strut. No mechanical anomalies found.]As a result of the testing and findings by the NTSB; Cirrus issued a number of Service Advisories and Service Bulletins beginning in 2016 and in 2018 updated the design of the NLG to increase the strength of strut tube; which the NTSB noted in its Report as follows:'To increase the strength of the weld in the critical area on the nose landing gear; the thickness of the main strut tube was analyzed with an increased wall thickness from 0.125-inch to the full thickness of 0.156-inch. The result of the analysis was an increase (3-5%) in the local stress levels in the static analysis. This design change has been made for all new and replacement gear.' Although when the incident occurred Cirrus may not have been aware of the potential for cracking to develop in the NLG of its aircraft; beginning at least on or before Day 2; when the first Service Advisory was issued; Cirrus knew of the potential of cracks developing in this NLG under certain anticipated operations and knowing this in 2018 redesigned the NLG to increase the strength of the welds in the critical area of the NLG and increased the wall thickness of the main strut tube. Knowing that the NLG on its SR20's and SR22's manufactured prior to 2018 were under designed to anticipate the types of operations which it was clearly aware of in 2016; and notwithstanding the fact that Cirrus in 2018 redesigned the NLG for these aircraft to anticipate operations which could result in cracking to the originally designed NLG; Cirrus has done nothing to protect owners and pilots from the potential consequences of a NLG crack during operations on affected aircraft. As of Day 3; there were sixty-seven (67) Cirrus aircraft which were grounded because of the identification of cracks in the originally installed NLG. In addition; over the past several years; there have been dozens if not into the hundreds of Cirrus aircraft which have had an originally installed NLG replaced because of cracks found in the NLG. It is truly fortunate that the NLG on these many planes did not crack during operation which could have resulted in catastrophic consequences. Given the number of Cirrus aircraft which have already developed cracks in the NLG and those that surely will given time; Cirrus should be directed to replace all existing originally under designed NLGs with the newly designed NLG referred to in the [incident]. Not doing so places all owners and pilots of affected SR20's and SR22's at grave risk for an incident which could be catastrophic. I have planned to have metallurgical testing of the NLG to determine the exact cause of its failure; however; since Cirrus has refused to return this part to me this has not; to date; been possible. This refusal to return this part to me raises concerns as to what Cirrus has to fear and hide from my testing of this part. The FAA should demand that Cirrus return this part to me or require that it be provided to the FAA along with other NLG they have recently removed and replaced for testing and analysis by the FAA.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.
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