ACFT DAMAGED AS RECOMMENDED LNDG PROC NOT FOLLOWED AS SPECIFIED IN CHKLIST USE.

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AS WE DEPARTED CLE I WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT. AT 10000 FT THE CAPT BEGAN THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST. SHORTLY AFTER HE STARTED READING; THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED; ALONG WITH A HYD PRESSURE LOW LIGHT AND A RUDDER CTL MANUAL ANNUNCIATOR. AT THIS TIME THE AUTOPLT TRIPPED OFF. THE CAPT SAID 'I HAVE THE ACFT' AND TOLD ME TO GET OUT THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST. I PULLED OUT MY MANUAL AND READ THE CHKLIST FOR HYD PRESSURE LOW LIGHT ON. THE SECOND STEP OF THE CHKLIST SAYS IF THE HYD PRESSURE AND QUANTITY ARE LOW THEN REFER TO THE CHKLIST FOR HYD PRESSURE AND HYD QUANTITY LOW. I LOOKED AT THE HYD PRESSURE GAUGE AND IT WAS FLUCTUATING BTWN 18 AND 16 QUARTS. I POINTED THIS OUT TO THE CAPT. HE SAID 'LET'S DO THE HYD PRESSURE AND QUANTITY LOW ABNORMAL CHKLIST.' I READ THE HYD PRESSURE AND QUANTITY LOW CHKLIST AND IT SAID THAT IF THE QUANTITY WAS LOW YOU WOULD HAVE TO DO A MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION. WHILE WE WERE DOING THE CHKLIST WE HAD TOLD CLE DEP CTL OF OUR PROBLEM AND WERE ON A VECTOR BACK TO CLE. I CONTACTED CLE MAINT ON COMPANY FREQ AND ASKED THEM IF THEY COULD BE OF ASSISTANCE AFTER I EXPLAINED OUR PROBLEM. THEY REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING MORE WE COULD DO. THE CAPT CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN WITH A MANUAL EXTENSION. ON THE ACFT WITH A MANUAL EXTENSION THE GEAR DOORS REMAIN HALF EXTENDED. IN OTHER WORDS THEY WILL FLY 80 KTS ON ROLLOUT AND THEN THEY WILL TOUCH DOWN ON ALUMINUM SKID PLATES; WHICH PROTECT THE SHEET METAL. ONE OTHER NOTE ON THE MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION SAYS TO REMAIN ON THE CENTERLINE OF THE RWY AND NOT TURN AFTER TOUCHDOWN AS THIS WILL TWIST THE ALREADY EXTENDED GEAR DOORS. AFTER TOUCHDOWN THE CAPT BEGAN A L HAND TURN ON A 90 DEG TAXIWAY. AS HE DID I SAID 'DON'T TURN'; HE KEPT TURNING SO AGAIN I SAID 'DON'T TURN.' HE TURNED OFF CLR OF THE RWY AND BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP. THE GEAR DOORS RECEIVED MINOR DAMAGE DURING THIS TURN. THIS WAS A CLASSIC BREAK DOWN OF CCC (CREW COORD CONCEPTS). THERE HAD BEEN A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF TENSION IN THE COCKPIT THE DAY BEFORE AND THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT. THIS FLC WAS NOT WELL MANAGED NOR WAS IT WELL COMMANDED. THE INCIDENT COULD POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THERE HAD BEEN MORE COM BTWN THE 2 PLTS.