MSP Tower Controller reported TRACON instructions to an arrival caused an unstable approach and a go-around. The Tower Controller stated that TRACON issued the instructions to comply with the new Converging Runway Operations (CRO) procedures at MSP; but the Tower Controller sees the procedures as unsafe as many factors are not included in CRO. The Controller indicated the procedures do not provide controllers the capability to ensure positive separation of aircraft.

Narrative

With arrivals and departures occurring on 30L; I noticed Aircraft X; arrival to converging Runway 35; executing a go-around at the same time that Local Control West (LCW); Runway 35 arrivals; called it out to the Tower Cab. The LCW Controller stated that Aircraft X executed a go-around due to an unstable approach. Converging Runway Operations (CRO) has been a source of numerous safety concerns at MSP since 7110.65 rule changes went into effect years ago. A couple of years before that; the NTSB published a Safety Recommendation (A-13-024) to which the FAA responded with the 7110.65 rule changes which required; in part; Arrival/Departure Window (ADW) compliance.An ADW is a predetermined section of airspace through which an arriving aircraft transitions to a non-intersecting converging runway while on approach to land. This section of airspace represents an area where if a departure from a non-intersecting; converging runway begins takeoff roll; and if the arrival to the non-intersecting converging runway executes a go-around; the two aircraft are in direct conflict. In the applicable runway configuration at MSP; aircraft land Runway 35; and land and depart Runways 30L and 30R. Should an aircraft departing Runway 30L/30R begin takeoff roll while an arriving aircraft to Runway 35 is in the ADW and the arriving aircraft to Runway 35 execute a go-around; the departure from Runway 30L/30R and the arrival now turned go-around to Runway 35 will be in direct conflict.ADW compliance is quite easily achieved at airports where dedicated departure only runways exist. However; at MSP in the northwest flow converging operation; the same runways that have departures; 30L and 30R; also have arrival aircraft spaced at 5-mile intervals. This creates; in effect; a double gap to which local controllers must adhere - the 5-mile gap between arrivals to Runway 30L/30R; as appropriate; as well as the ADW gap with respect to aircraft landing Runway 35. It is possible that the space between arrivals to Runway 30L/30R would correspond with an arrival to Runway 35 being within the ADW - recently renamed 'No Departure Zone;' or NDZ. When the arrival to Runway 35 is in the ADW/NDZ; the departure from 30L would not be allowed to begin takeoff roll.In order to make 'usable' gaps for Runway 30L departures; Converging Runway Display Aid; CRDA; is employed. This attempts to position arrivals to Runway 35 in such a manner that they correlate with a usable gap between arrivals to Runway 30L. This way the Runway 35 arrival is not in the ADW/NDZ at the time a Runway 30L departure would need to begin takeoff roll. This requires Minneapolis TRACON M98 to appropriately position arrival aircraft to match the ghost targets as provided via CRDA. In the case of Aircraft X; the Approach Controller's last transmission to the aircraft was to 'maintain 180 kt. or greater until a 5-mile final; contact Tower;' in an attempt to match the CRDA ghost target. Aircraft X was also vectored high and fast in such a manner that it was quite obvious Aircraft X was not being put in a position for a successful; stable approach. This was done in the name of CRDA; and ultimately to facilitate CRO.Once Aircraft X executed their go-around; the Local West Controller was placed in a position to 'take IMMEDIATE action to resolve traffic conflicts' as per the MSP Tower SOP. However; this statement is in direct contradiction with the NTSB's Safety Recommendation which states; 'Because of the nature of the geometry of the encounters and the unexpected nature of the go-arounds; it was not possible for the ATC tower controllers to issue effective control instructions to ensure that the airplanes avoided each other.' Fortunately traffic was light at the time and the go-around occurred at a sufficient distance from the airport so as not to cause a concern. Had this happened with busier traffic and with Aircraft X closer to the airport; this would have represented a major issue; one which controllers are unable to accurately assess and mitigate per the NTSB safety recommendation. This is just one example of numerous safety concerns that surround converging runway operations at MSP.The modeling used to determine ADW/NDZ dimensions will allow for less than near mid-air collision; NMAC; criteria; and does not accurately consider flight paths that aircraft take on go-arounds or departure. Wake turbulence encounters with converging aircraft are not fully considered or vetted.The FAA still expects controllers to issue instructions to increase distance between aircraft when the NTSB clearly states that this cannot be achieved due to a human factors limitation. If local controllers incorrectly judge the trajectory of aircraft on final and an ADW/NDZ non-compliant situation occurs; the converging arrival 'should' be sent around per local SOP. This creates the exact scenario that these procedures are designed to avoid and mitigate.This is just a brief highlight of the concerns with CRO at MSP. There are others - space available in the narrative of this report will not allow for full explanation. Despite these concerns; this operation is being run not due to the demand to arrive 3 runways. The current traffic levels can easily be accommodated using just 30L and 30R for arrivals. The additional risk of pointing aircraft at each other and hoping that a go-around does not happen is being incurred to facilitate training of air traffic controllers in anticipation of future runway construction.I would welcome the opportunity to discuss the safety issues with CRO at MSP further. The incident with Aircraft X will most likely be highlighted by FAA Management as a success of the operation. Workforce personnel tasked with executing CRO would label it a 'canary in the coal mine;' illustrating just how poorly this operation can go when the wrong set of factors are in place. And this increased risk is being tolerated for no substantial benefit to the NAS (National Airspace System).