2023-07 · NASA ASRS report 2018957
A319 flight crew reported communication and coordination problems with ground personnel during push-back resulting in damage to the aircraft. Reporters stated procedures and language barrier contributed to the event.
On flight XXXX; communication between flight deck and ground crew was extremely poor from the very beginning. As Captain; I believe it was a combination of the Bluetooth headset; and the fact that the ground person did not have English as his primary language. Of course; that is not his fault; but there definitely was a communication barrier. When we requested push off of Gate XX; the ramp controller said; 'push approved; but pull up abeam Gate XY to disconnect.' I relayed this to the tug operator; but he had no understanding of what I was saying. I mentioned to my copilot that' I don't know how to say it any clearer. He just doesn't understand me.' After several attempts to explain our request to the tug operator; I finally asked my copilot to ask ramp if we could just disconnect in front of [Gate] XX because the ground person had no idea what I was saying. The ramp controller could sense our frustration; and he said fine; just disconnect there. I told the tug operator that 'ramp said we could disconnect where we were and would you like me to set brakes?'. He said 'yes; set brakes.' I responded 'brakes set; pressure normal.' My copilot and I came to realize that when he pushed us back; the tug operator had pushed to an extreme angle; and basically had jackknifed the tug so that the tug and the airplane were facing in the same direction. I would guess that the angle was somewhere between 130 and 150 deg. I called maintenance; and asked them to come out. Eventually they came out; and were monitoring the situation; but they never got on headset. I repeatedly requested through the maintenance frequency; to get someone on headset for me. There were long gaps where the tug operator did not answer me; and those times that he did; it was very hard to understand what he was saying. He obviously did not understand what I was saying either. The tug operator and ground personnel could not remove the tow bar due to the extreme angle. I asked if he would like brakes released so that he could pull forward and reduce the angle. He said yes. I responded 'brakes released. I never intended; nor thought; that he would disconnect the tow bar until he instructed me to set brakes again. All I wanted him to do was correct the angle; then I could set brakes; and then he could remove the tow bar. From that point on; my understanding was that the tug operator was in control of the airplane; and I was going to wait for further instruction. During this time; the person in front of the airplane had batons crossed; but he was not part of the conversation with the tug operator and myself. I mentioned to my copilot I have one guy; saying one thing with the batons; and the other guy on the tug telling me he wants brakes released. During this entire incident; maintenance stood there; watching what was going on; but no one would get on headset. At some point; the airplane started to move; and I was not surprised. I thought that the tug operator wanted to move the airplane; and was doing so. Within a second; or so; after the airplane had started moving; the tug operator; said 'set brakes set brakes.' He did not say; 'break away; break away.' Which would've been much more clear; as I would've understood immediately that he had lost control of the airplane. When the airplane was moving; and he said 'set brakes; set brakes; ' I was initially confused why he would want me to set brakes while he was moving the airplane. I was afraid to jam on the brakes and have him damage the nose gear with the tugI did smoothly come on the brakes and stop the airplane though. At this point; I was not aware that any damage had been done; but in retrospect; I believe some damage likely happened with the initial push and jackknife. I also believe this why there were such large gaps when the tug operator was not answering me; and that he may have been experiencing some anxiety. This is purely a guess on my part as the tug operator never described any damage to me. Finally; someone other than the tug operator got on the headset and informed me that there was damage done to the aircraft. I don't know if this was another ground person; or if it was maintenance. He said that we needed to go back to the gate. What I really wanted to do was leave the engines shut down and be towed to the gate;.... but towing was what had started the problem in the first place and I did not trust that course of action based on what I had just seen. If the aircraft was able to taxi; I felt that me moving the aircraft was the safest thing to do. I confirmed with maintenance that the aircraft was capable of taxi. Because I had earlier shut down both engines; we were currently on APU power. We restarted the number one engine; and taxied back to Gate XX without incident. Once parked; I donned my vest; and went down to survey the damage. I was also concerned that someone may have been injured. Although no one was injured; one person was clearly shook up. I saw the tennis ball sized indent above the nose gear on the right side of the plane; approximately 7 feet above the ground. It was obvious that the airplane was going to be grounded. I went back up to the flight deck and jet-bridge where I spoke with customer service; and informed her that the airplane was out of service; and then made a PA to the passengers. I then immediately called the duty officer; and explained the situation. He was very supportive; spoke with another duty officer; and contacted the Chief Pilot on call. Based on the information we gave them; the three of them felt that we were not at fault; and safe to continue....if we felt able. However; we did not. My copilot; who is relatively new; felt uneasy to continue. I too felt uncomfortable. I have been a Captain at Company A for 16 years and employed here for XX years. Before that I was a Captain in the military since the early 90s. I never seen anything like this; nor had this much trouble communicating with someone who was in control of the airplane. I also had never had so much trouble getting someone to talk to me from the ground. I estimate there were approximately a dozen people standing there. My copilot; and I discussed the situation; and we did not feel that it was safe to continue."
I preface this by saying that all communication between the tug crew and the Captain was relayed to me through the Captain; as I was not on interphone during pushback. I was taught during sim training and IOE that interphone should be de-selected by the First Officer (FO) during pushback in order to avoid erroneous 'cleared to push' transmissions to the tug driver while actually speaking to ramp. It was only after this incident that I found reference on Flight Manual page XXXX that it is acceptable for the First Officer to monitor the interphone during pushback.The ramp cleared us to pushback from [Gate] XX; then pull up abeam [Gate] XY to disconnect. The tug driver pushed us straight back and stopped; at which point the Captain reminded them to pull us up. They maneuvered the tug back and forth but did not pull us up. The Captain asked them again to pull up. The Captain had communication with the tug until this point; then the driver responded intermittently while he struggled with the tug. It was around this time; another aircraft on ramp frequency said that our tug was jackknifed on the aircraft; and I look out my right side window and see the tug below me about 135 degrees relative to the nose. At this point the parking brake was set as instructed. We told the push crew they could disconnect where we were if that's better for them. As it appeared that wasn't going to work; the Captain offered to release the brake so they could pull us forward to see if they could disconnect the tug by moving the airplane. They accepted this offer; and the Captain declared at least 3 times that the brake is released. Despite this; the marshaller at the nose kept his wands crossed. This prompted the Captain to repeat the status that the brakes were released. When it became apparent that this was going to cause a delay; maintenance was called and we shut down the number 2 engine to save fuel. Maintenance arrives but all communications with the tug cease. Lots of people are gathered around the nose; some are yelling at each other. We made no less than 5 attempts to establish communication with the tug crew; trying through maintenance and operations frequencies; as well as flashing the taxi light. Then; I noticed the aircraft start to roll. At first; I assumed we were being towed forward by the tug at last. However; given my vantage point of seeing the tug still at an acute angle to the nose; I said ' we're moving; we're moving'. As I was reaching for the toe brakes; he applied them. I estimate we moved about 5-10 feet forward in total. The parking brake was then set; and still having no comms with below; we elected to shut down the remaining engine (1) until we figure out what's going on. One of the members of the push crew walks out in front of the airplane and lays down on his back on the ramp; at which point our concern shifts to possible injuries on the ground. Finally after probably 10-20 minutes of radio silence from the push crew; we hear that nobody was injured; they've successfully removed the tug and tow bar; and they would like us to return to the gate under our own power because there was damage sustained to the airplane. We run the appropriate checklists for shutdown and startup; and start engine 1; pulling back in to [Gate] XX shortly thereafter. It is then we learn that at some point during the sequence; the tug driver had passed out. We were also informed that one of the ramp crew got very close to the number 2 engine; but didn't specify if it was running at the time. At the time the aircraft rolled forward; only engine 1 was running.Lack of clear communication from the ground crew was a significant factor; as there seemed to be lots of confusion about the initial instructions about pushing back and pulling forward to disconnect. The Captain told me that communications with the tug were spotty from the beginning; either due to a headset issue; language barrier; or both. He made every effort to communicate the status of the parking brake; which should have been corroborated with the orange indicator light on the nose gear. The last clear communication from the push crew was that they wanted the brakes released so they could attempt to pull the aircraft forward abeam [Gate] XY in order to disconnect the tow bar at a more proper angle. We believed they were trying to do this because they said they were; and we felt the tug straining to pull us. It would then be at least 15 minutes before they reestablished comms. I don't know if the interphone became disconnected when the tug was angled so extremely; or if the tug crew was so overwhelmed with their error that they didn't have time to speak. Either way; it was extremely frustrating that there was virtually no communication with the tug; especially since everybody's last understanding was that the brakes were released. From our understanding per the ground crew after the fact; the damage to the aircraft was sustained before the breakaway event; and was a result of the jackknifing of the tug.This event highlights the critical importance of communication between crew and tug driver. I can't help but wonder if I was listening to tug communications if a more clear picture could have been ascertained. It should be reinforced to training department personnel that it is permissible for First Officers to listen to the interphone during pushback. I am absolutely certain that all communications made by Captain to the tug driver were clear; understandable; and SOP compliant. The brake release was acknowledged by the ground crew; corroborated by the nose gear indicator light; and made logical sense. There was absolutely no verbal communication to the flight deck to set the brake at any point before the breakaway.After the incident; we notified dispatch and the Chief Pilot. The captain and I felt mentally impacted by the event to such an extent that we would not be fit for duty to continue to destination on another aircraft.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.
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