MD-11 Captain reported 32 alerts and malfunctions; from various aircraft systems; after leveling at cruise. The crew returned to the departure airport; dumped fuel and landed safely.

Narrative

Departed ZZZZ on Runway XX. Shortly after level off at FL 300 (about 30 minutes into flight - Approximately XB:45); the First Officer (FO) went to back to start his rest period. Captain was flying and relief pilot was operating radios in the right seat. About 2 minutes after FO went to back to rest; we received (time XB:47):the FIRE WARNING BELL; the TRI-TONE WARNING; and ENGINE FIRE ORAL WARNING accompanied by level 3 ENIGINE FIRE" alerts on engines 1; 2; 3 and APU. Simultaneously on synoptic pages; we had level 2 "MSC AUTO FAIL" alert and level 1 "CAWS FAULT"; "ENGINE IGN MANUAL" ; "ENG FIRE AGENT LO" and "CARGO FIRE AGENT DISCH TIMING INOP" alerts. #4 Display Unit (DU) had intermittent Blank screen and RED X.On overhead panel "BAT BUS OFF" light illuminated.ALSO; on the overhead Panel; the IGNITION SWITCHES Had no power and did not work.On the on the MCDU we had "SENSOR FAIL" message; "CLOCK 1 FAIL MESSAGE" and it appeared the Inertial Reference Units (IRUs) #1 and AUX were not working correctly. On the pedestal; All radio heads were dark with no power. The radios worked; but we could not see frequencies or change stations.All these issues occurred simultaneously. OUR RESPONSE:I silenced the Fire Bell; the TRI-TONE and ENGINE FIRE ORAL warnings. The relief pilot and I both scanned the alerts and messages. The was a moment of disbelief on my part that so many things could go wrong at one time. We decided to slow the response down till we figured out what the problem truly was.We scanned the Engine instruments; EGTs; N1; N2; EPRs; Fuel Flows; Oil temps and pressures. All instruments indicated in normal ranges. The was no vibration of aircraft and no sound changes. All flight controls appeared to be normal and Autopilot was still working. We looked at all the system pages to see their status. We discussed what we saw and agreed that it was unlikely that there was any true Fire on the engines. I elected not to do the engine fire and severe damage checklist at this time since that would lead us to shut down all three engines. Based on what we saw on the plane and not knowing what was working and what was not working; We decided that we would land. In a quick attempt to see if it was a small problem that could be resolved easily; we ran the checklist for level 2 "MSC AUTO FAIL" and looked "BAT BUS OFF" light. It was no help. I then tried to switch IRU (Captain on AUX). This did not help so I returned the IRU to normal position. We could not make any changes to radios and could not make a SAT COMM call to company. We sent ACARs message to Maintenance Control/Operations that we were going to have to return and land at ZZZZ and could they call us on SAT COMM. They sent us the weather for ZZZZ1. We resent message. Recalled FO to the front.We informed ATC (ZZZZ [Center]) that we would have to land and was [requesting priority handling]. We told him we would get back to him shortly.The FO came up front (approximately time XC:00). I gave a quick recap of what happened and asked him what he saw. He looked and agreed on what was being presented by the airplane.We got an ACARs message from company; unable SAT COMM call.We are now about 15 minutes into [problem].We (the 3 pilots) discussed landing options and what we thought was the real issues with the airplane. The closest airport was ZZZZ2. The FO ask we thought we were on fire and would we loose flying capability. We discussed it and felt it was safe enough to return to ZZZZ. The decision was made to land at ZZZZ. I made the statement that if anything else occurred; we would land immediately at ZZZZ2. We all were in agreement with this plan.We got clearance from ATC and started a right turn back towards ZZZZ. Then FO got into right seat. We start the fuel dump checklist using only 1 push on the fuel dump switch; so as to dump to max landing weight.I asked then FO to insert new destination (ZZZZ) in the MCDU and build an approach for ILS runway XX.The relief pilot started a written list of issues and responses. He said at one point he had counted 32 alerts and issues with airplane at one time.We began the fuel dump and started to descend from FL 300 to FL 250. The fuel dump started XC:08 and ended at XC:24 on heading 120 from about 50 miles southwest of ZZZZ2 till about 50 miles west of the coastline. All fuel dump was at or above FL250. We dumped 80;000 pounds of fuel. Our landing weight was 476;000 pounds.About half an hour into [problem]; after we had set course back to ZZZZ and after we started fuel dump; all alerts went away. The company then called us on SAT COMM. We gave quick brief of what happened and what we our intensions were to land ZZZZ. He asked us to call him on the ground.Captain flew the leg and landing. The winds were 270/14. I elected to an Autoland on Runway XX at ZZZZ with medium autobrakes and landing flaps 35. We configured early. It was gusty wind day and ALPHA was low. I had FO add 3 knots to approach speed. We had requested the fire department standby for our landing. After landing; we exited the runway on high-speed Taxiway (1) and had fire department inspect the airplane. The Fire Department did an addition inspection of airplane after we blocked in and shutdown engines. The Fire Department then released airplane to Maintenance.Once in blocks and engine shutdown; we briefed Maintenance and showed pictures of alerts before making any calls. We had been instructed by Tower to call a phone number which was the country's safety investigation department (or something like that) the phone number was XXX-XXX-XXXX. We called chief pilot first; then safety department. Next; I called Dispatch. Then assistant chief pilot called me. Then I made all the write ups. While this was happening; the country's version of the FAA was standing by cockpit door requesting a written statement. I had the relief pilot write the statement; I read it and signed it.Both the safety phone call and the gentleman requesting the written statement; stated the company needed to provide the country with written documentation of engineering evaluation and written reports of the maintenance records BEFORE the plane would be allowed to fly again. They asked me to email them all airplane records and reports. I told them I did not have the authority to email the records but that I would pass that information to the company. I reported this to the assistant chief pilot in a debrief phone call from hotel.We blocked out at XA:54 Day 0. We took off at XB:17. The [problem] started about XB:47. [Requested priority handling] about XC:00. We landed at XC:54. Canceled the [priority handling] about XD:00. We blocked in at XD:10.Due to the intense nature of dealing with a [problem] and in this case; for several hours; followed by the intensity of the debriefs; phone calls and reports on the ground; fatigue set in. In my judgement; it would have been a bad judgement to attempt to fly another leg. We felt most exhausted about 2 hours after blocking in. I personally feel that a minimum of 24 hours of rest should be given to pilots after an event like this. There is a lot to process and many calls to be made even after getting to hotel.This was an extremely challenging flight. This flight caused all 3 of us to rely on the systems knowledge and training we had received here at company and to think outside the box. The FO and relief pilot did an excellent job working the problems as they came. Due to time constraints; there were times when each of us had different objectives duties/checklist/radios/flying/etc that we each accomplished independently. After completing individual tasks; we would come back together as a team and check each other's work and communicate. We stayed on same page and thought process then entire time. The FO and relief pilot stayed engaged; did a job well done and should be commended.Cause: This was multiple malfunctions. Probably an electrical issue causing multiple system failures and possible indication failures. Suggestions: This could not be prevented from an operational crew point. Continue current training. All ended well on this flight."