ACR BREAKS OUT OF CLOUDS TO SEE SMA WITHIN 200 FT OF ACFT. NO TIME FOR EVASIVE ACTION.

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JUST AS WE EXITED CLOUDS (IMC); AND JUST AFTER CTR HDOF TO HONOLULU APCH CTL; MY FO ALERTED ME TO OBSERVE A CLOSE-RANGE; OPPOSITE-DIRECTION ACFT. NEITHER CTR; NOR APCH CTL CALLED THIS OPPOSING TFC TO OUR ATTN. I WAS FLYING THE LEG AND HAD THE AUTOPLT ON AT THE TIME. WE WERE STILL IN THE CLOUDS WHEN APCH CTL ISSUED US A VECTOR-HEADING AND ADVISED US TO EXPECT A VISUAL APCH TO 4R. IN RESPONSE TO THESE INSTRUCTIONS; AND STILL IMC; I ASKED MY FO TO GO 'HEADS-UP; EYES-OUTSIDE' FOR A MOMENT; WHILE I PROCEEDED TO SET UP MY NAV RADIOS TO HNL VORTAC; AND HNL ILS 4R (AUTOPLT STILL ON). (THE LCD DIGITAL FREQ READ OUTS ON THE NAVS IN THE ACFT WE WERE FLYING APE TOO DIM TO CROSS-SET FROM PLT TO COPLT AND VICE VERSA; REQUIRING BOTH PLTS TO SET THEIR OWN NAVS.) IT WAS WHILE THE FO WAS 'HEADS-UP; EYES OUTSIDE'; AND WHILE I WAS SETTING UP MY NAV RADIOS; THAT WE EXITED THE CLOUDS; AND THE FO IMMEDIATELY CALLED OUT THE OPPOSING TFC. I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED UP IN RESPONSE; ONLY TO SEE A WHITE; SINGLE-ENG; HIGH-WING; SMA TYPE AIRPLANE; WITH TEAL-BLUE MARKINGS; FLY DIRECTLY ABOVE THE COCKPIT; AT WHAT APPEARED TO BE ABOUT 200 FT; IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE A CLBING; R TURNING; EVASIVE MANEUVER; HEADING ABOUT ESE; TOWARDS THE CLOUDS WE HAD JUST EXITED; AND NOT CONFORMING TO LEGAL; VFR; CLOUD SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS. THERE WAS NO TIME ON MY BEHALF TO DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN BARELY GET A GLIMPSE OF THE OPPOSING SMA FLY DIRECTLY OVERHEAD. I POSITIVELY TURNED CTL OF THE ACFT TO THE FO AND SUBSEQUENTLY MADE ATTEMPTS TO IDENT THE ACFT IN QUESTION THROUGH INQUIRIES VIA RADIO CONTACT WITH HONOLULU FSS AND MOLOKAI TWR; DESCRIBING THE COLOR AND MARKINGS OF THE SMA IN HOPES OF DETERMINING THE ACFT'S IDENT NUMBER. NEITHER HONOLULU FSS NOR MOLOKAI TWR COULD ASSIST ME WITH THE DESCRIPTIONS I GAVE THEM; (I MISTAKENLY INFORMED MKK TWR THAT THE SMA IN QUESTION WAS IN MKK ATA AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT). LATER DURING THE DAY; AFTER INQUIRING WITH KAPALUA-W MAUI AIRPORT (JHM) UNICOM OPERATOR; SHE INFORMED ME THAT SHE HAD MADE A TELEPHONE CALL TO A PLT X BELIEVED TO BE WITH FBO OF MAUI; AND UNI BELIEVED THAT PLT X HAD BEEN THE PLT OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED SMA IN QUESTION. UNI SAID THAT PLT X DID SAY THAT SHE WAS FLYING WITHIN MKK TWR AIRSPACE AT ABOUT X:35 (L); AND WAS 'OF COURSE' COMMUNICATING WITH MKK TWR AT THAT TIME. I WOULD LIKE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND COMMEND MY FO FOR HIS VIGILANCE AND PROFESSIONALISM THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THIS INCIDENT. THIS INCIDENT PROBABLY COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF: TCASII WAS INSTALLED IN THE ACFT WE WERE FLYING; AS REQUIRED...THE DELAYED INSTALLING OF WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE FAA. BETTER VIGILANCE AND COMS WERE EXTENDED TO US ON BEHALF OF: (A) THE CTR RADAR CTLR; AND (B) THE APCH RADAR CTLR. BETTER VIGILANCE AND COMS EXISTED BTWN THE CTR RADAR CTLR AND THE APCH RADAR CTLR; ESPECIALLY DURING THE RADAR HDOF. THE VFR ACFT'S PLT OBEYED THE FARS RELATING TO VFR FLT. THE 'SYS' DID NOT LEGALLY ALLOW AIRSPACE TO BE MIXED WITH IFR AND VFR TFC.