Air carrier Captain reported the aircraft encountered a series of large and deep divots in the runway surface during takeoff roll that caused the aircraft nose to lift into the air. Flight crew rejected takeoff and returned to the gate for maintenance inspection.

Narrative

We were operating a flight from Benito Juarez International (MMMX) in Mexico City to ZZZ. The initial plan was to depart runway 5R from Mexico City; instead of 5L to improve the performance margins being that runway 5R is longer than 5L. During pushback we were informed by ground control that the airport was switching to runway 23 L/R due to the change in wind direction.The FO and I continued our normal operating procedures including pushback; engine start; checklists and briefings. We reconfigured for a runway 23L takeoff and received our taxi clearance to holding point runway 23L with clearances to cross both runways 23R and 23L. During taxi out we experienced poor surface conditions on taxiways and runways. It was something we discussed earlier in the day and the associated threats that it may impose. At one point we taxied over a large and deep divot in the vicinity of the intersection between taxiway B and runway 23L. The FO and I discussed now significant it was but we did not believe that it caused any damage. We continued taxing and conducted the normal operating procedures including load close out briefings and before takeoff checklists. We received our takeoff clearance and taxied on to the runway; and as previously briefed; I handed the controls to the FO who was acting as pilot flying on this leg. He started the takeoff roll; and everything appeared normal with the exception of a few light bumps on the runway. A few seconds later we encountered a series of large and deep divots in the runway surface that caused the nose of the airplane to lift significantly in the air; and coming off the ground. I immediately decided to reject the takeoff due to the controllability issues; the interrupted acceleration invalidating the performance data; and potential damage to the aircraft. Initially; I thought the takeoff reject occurred at approximately 60-70 kts; but after consulting with FOQA data; the reject occurred at approximately 100 kts. I applied the standard rejected takeoff procedures; and had plenty of runway to decelerate slowly after the initial abrupt deceleration from the auto brakes. Once we've decelerated to a slow and safe taxi speed the FO reported the rejected takeoff to the control tower. The controller asked if we needed any assistance; to which we replied we did not; as there weren't any signs of fire or structural aircraft damage. We did smell the odor associated with strong brake application; and a caution light associated with the right engine thrust reverser. We taxied off onto taxiway E2 and brought the aircraft to a stop. I made a PA to the passengers to remain seated; briefly explained the nature of the issue; and reassured the passengers of our safety. I also called the number 1 flight attendant to discuss the situation and to standby for further instructions. Finally; I had informed the control tower as to what had happened in an effort to share information regarding the runway conditions. The FO and I reevaluated and discussed what had happened; and made the joint decision to taxi the aircraft back to the gate. We believed the aircraft was able to taxi safely as there weren't any signs of structural damage or aircraft fire. The taxing capabilities; including nose wheel steering; had not become compromised. The right engine thrust reverser caution light had extinguished after recycling the associated thrust reverser. My discussion with the flight attendant ascertained that there were not any signs of fire or aircraft damage from the main cabin perspective. Additionally; I called our dispatcher to discuss what had happened; and to coordinate maintenance and operations at the gate. We requested and received clearance for taxi back to the hardstand gate XX; where we proceeded to wait roughly 20 minutes for the operations and maintenance crew to arrive and service our aircraft. After gate arrival; I had further discussed with our flight attendants what our plans and intentions were; which was to have maintenance inspect the aircraft and determine if another departure was possible with consideration to the result of the inspection; brake cooling requirements; runway conditions; and our duty time limitations. I also provided passengers with timely updates during this process; and provided reassurances towards a safe and timely resolution. I created an entry to the logbook about the rejected takeoff due to the rough surface causing the nose to bounce off the ground. However; I forgot to include the thrust reverser caution light in the logbook entry. The mechanic did see the maintenance light on the after overhead panel; and did address and clear the fault. The maintenance team quickly performed their inspections; to which they reported no signs of aircraft structural impact or damage; no degradation in the condition of the landing gear wheels and brakes; and sufficient brake cooling had occurred. I had performed a walk around myself; and also agreed that the aircraft was still in an airworthy state. After consultation with the head mechanic who performed the inspection; duty pilot; dispatcher; chief pilot; the FO; and flight attendants; I decided to make another departure attempt; to which we were able to do successfully without any issues. On the second attempt; I was pilot flying and we had departed from runway 23R from the taxiway B intersection. Cause: The Mexico City airport needs to improve monitoring and communication of the surface conditions of runways and taxiways. Improvements needed for notices to pilots in company charts; bulletins; and familiarization guides about the possibility of encountering uncharted; non-communicated; and unexpected rough surfaces during taxi; takeoff and landings. Additionally; more information is needed about the threats imposed from unimproved surface conditions on company charts at airports known to have them; and mitigation strategies such as choosing a different runway; and adjusting elevator input to reduce loads placed on the nose gear when operating on rough surfaces.