2025-07 · NASA ASRS report 2264702
A319 flight crew reported temporary loss of aircraft control due to First Officer control inputs.
Enroute to ZZZ from ZZZ1. Third leg of a 4 leg day. Still air; smooth flight. Seat belt sign off. First Officer was the pilot flying. I was the pilot monitoring. While in cruise at FL390 the FO and I were engaged in small talk when we both felt; and noticed what was either a mountain wave; or simply a change in wind direction. Our attention was brought to the PFD (Primary Flight Display) where we both simultaneously noticed our speed trend arrow increasing toward VMO. We were not in danger of a VMO as the speed was 30kts or more away. No other indications; pitch; altitude; etc. were noticed. As my attention was on the PFD I heard the relay of the AP (Autopilot) disengage. I spoke out; 'what are you doing'. At the same time the aircraft was abruptly climbing and a significant pitch up movement; and increase in G was felt. It was evident that the FO was manipulating the right side stick. I yelled out; 'Stop; Stop'. The First Officer then reversed the pitch up trend with an equally aggressive pitch down trend. I then yelled out 'don't do that; let go; let go; I have control'. As I put my hand on the left side stick to take control of the aircraft; I pushed and held down the left side stick red switch and heard the priority left announcement. The aircraft was oscillating and I released the left side stick to allow the aircraft to stable. Once stable; I then manipulated the side stick into the flight director; smoothly; and turned on the AP 2. At this point I noticed we were 175ft high; and correcting. No other indications on the PFD were abnormal. The AP corrected itself back to FL390. I took about 90 seconds to pause before debriefing the FO on what happened. The FO said to me she thought that is what we had to do to avoid an over speed. She said she had remembered doing it; or something like it during her training; and then she said that is what she saw Captains do on steep approaches to control airspeed. About 5 minutes went by while I was in disbelief. The first thing in my mind was did we bust altitude. Second was did we stress the aircraft. The third was; was anybody hurt. We were within +300ft the entire time and ATC never prompted. I did not see; or receive any reports of limitation exceedances; including g load. After about 5 minutes I called the lead FA to get a report. The lead reported that every single passenger had their seat belt on. Not one passenger injury. But the two aft FA's were seated in row XX A; and F when the incident happened. The lead said the 3 and 4 FA both bumped there heads and were fit for duty. In the descent I called back after about 10 minutes from the first call and I spoke with the lead again to get an update. She said; no changes; just a mess with drinks that spilled on the passengers. I did not see a need to declare an emergency. Once on the ground; and after deplaning the passengers (zero passenger reported injuries that I am aware of); I went to the back of the aircraft to talk to FA 3 and 4. Both were physically shaken up. Both had been bruised from the tossing. Both FA 3 and 4 said they were fit for duty. But once I saw the damage that there heads did to the over head panel; I immediately called for a paramedic. One of the two injured was cleared fit for duty by the paramedic and herself; the other was taken to the hospital for injuries. To my knowledge the FA that was take to the hospital had a CT scan of the brain and neck and was released hours later. While we waited I wrote up the damage on row XX over head panel and then spoke with Maintenance control; specifically asking if they saw any exceedances from the event. Maintenance Control cleared the aircraft. We spend the night in ZZZ1 awaiting two new replacement FA's and an FO since the Chief Pilot took her off of flight duty. The First Officers actions at FL390 took me off guard. This was a classic startle factor of human factors. We discussed the incident after. She appeared confused. I don't think she understands the risks of high altitude maneuvering. This appears to be a common theme with new hires that were CFI's in a Cessna just months ago. It is getting tiresome. And this FO is one of the better ones.
During cruise at 39;000'; the aircraft was subjected to occasional light to moderate chop/turbulence; with minor speed variations either under managed (M0.78) in smooth air or selected speed (M0.76) with turbulence encountered. The aircraft was on automation from 100' on departure onward. At the time of the event; there was no continuous detectable turbulence and speed was managed. While still in cruise and nearing the descent phase; the aircraft experienced a sudden airspeed variation with the speed trend arrow on the airspeed indicator nearing or exceeding MMO. As a result of this trend; I removed automation and applied a pitch up (back pressure) on the control side stick; in an attempt to reverse the airspeed trend. This resulted in a climb and an altitude increase of 150'. The Captain intervened and said to relieve the back pressure; which was done promptly and back onto altitude and speed. This entire event happened in the span of about 10 seconds. Although the aircraft was able to get back on profile; I had overcorrected during the event; the rear flight attendants hit their heads on the ceiling and became injured. Thankfully; there were no reports of passenger injuries. After the event; we called the FAs on the cabin phone to assess the extent of the immediate injuries to the rear FAs; and paramedics were met at the arrival airport. Mechanics were called to examine the ceiling panels and flight data showed that the maneuver remained within structural limits of the aircraft. Immediately following the event; the Captain debriefed me on the proper technique to rectify a potential over speed at high altitude. Some alternatives to automation removal and maneuvering in this scenario include: speed brakes; thrust idle; and a lower selected speed. Because my experience in simulated over speed during simulator training was also done primarily without automation; I did not immediately fully consider the other possible solutions and instead acted instinctively because in that moment; I believed an overspeed would happen without intervention. Unfortunately my reaction and overcorrection resulted in injury; and in the future I will fully consider all possible solutions before acting; utilize better CRM before making a decision; and further educate myself on Airbus protections and systems.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.
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