EMB-175 Captain reported an unstable approach and bounced landing.

Narrative

I was PM on the ILS RWY XX approach and the initial approach was normal. The approach was stabilized; including at 1;000ft and 500ft; with proper configuration; on target speed; rate of descent; and engines spooled. The autopilot was properly disconnected by 2;200ft MSL; honoring the approach limitation of autopilot coupled approaches NA below 2200. The PF transitioned to the PAPI; mildly fluctuating below the glide slope but on an appropriate vertical path towards the touchdown zone of runway XX; continuing on speed and a stabilized" rate of descent all the way to touchdown. My perception was the aircraft crossed the threshold below the PAPI; at an aiming point between 500-750' past the threshold; on speed; sinking 700-900fpm. The cadence of the RA callouts was a little quicker than normal. At 30' I remember the pitch attitude nearing 6 degrees; in a normal attitude for touchdown. Given the above parameters; the PM did not make any callouts prior to the aircraft's touchdown with the runway. The aircraft proceeded to bounce; I immediately took control and executed the light bounce procedure in the AOM; maintaining the landing pitch attitude and completing the landing while at idle. The approach was debriefed at the gate; I called Maintenance Control; submitted a logbook entry; and finished other postflight duties. It is my opinion there were no appreciable environmental factors affecting airspeed or path control on this approach; such as turbulence or wake turbulence. No Vapp adjustments or "proficiency" exercises such as an "auto-throttles off" approach were made for this approach and landing.Cause: The Captain is ultimately responsible for the safe operation of the entire flight; including monitoring the performance of other flight crew members. Regardless of the "PF;" "PM;" "Instructor;" or other assigned roles in the flight deck; the captain is always monitoring the state of the aircraft to ensure the health and safety of our customers and team members; as well as the safety and integrity of the aircraft and its airworthiness. That requires using all available information; especially on the outcome of an approach and landing. For a landing; that requires using all sensory cues; flight instrument cross check; CRM; and more. Ultimately; I think I felt more comfortable than I should have been with the descent rate being "stable" by the numbers; an appropriate pitch attitude for landing; and normal bracketed airspeed. Those factors alone do not exclusively allow for a proper touchdown on the runway surface. In the final seconds prior to touchdown; the increased sink rate between the threshold and initial touchdown (greater than 3 degree path) was not mitigated accurately once a suitable aiming point was assured. And possibly; a further rate of descent than that was not detected by either crew member. I detected a 100; possibly 200fpm descent rate greater than desired over the runway. My sensory cues showed a slightly increased rate of closure with the ground (visually); along with 50; 40; 30; 20; 10 callouts from the aural system. My first reaction was to ensure the aircraft was at an appropriate attitude for landing; which it was. Knowing the natural ~3 degree nose up attitude on a typical flaps 5 approach; a 1-2 degree increase during the flare would put the aircraft approximately at 4-5 degrees nose up. The consistent 6 degree attitude; without any appreciable correction in the final moments prior to touchdown affirmed to me the PF was not dangerously compensating for the approach with pitch. I became overconfident with the ability to properly arrest the descent rate prior to touchdown in the final 20-30 feet; which did not occur. Contributing to this assessment was my determination that I never heard the thrust levers in OVRD mode; I did not sense an airspeed decay below Vref either; which often would cause an increased rate of closure with the runway. Once the aircraft bounced; the attention it took for the immediate transfer of controls I think masked the severity of the bounce. Had I known how hard it really was; a go around would have been a non-negotiable; immediate response to the bounce.Suggestions: I am in continuing dialogue to best understand the flight data and identify what threats may have been missed; as to do everything I can to learn from this event and prevent recurrence in all future approaches/ landings. We cannot wait for EGPWS alerts like "SINK RATE" to go-around and protect the aircraft from an undesired outcome; nor can we always be protected by descending through 200ft; 100ft; or even 50-30 feet with normal bracketed speed and descent rates below 1;000fpm. Every second and every decision on short final is an important one to protect the integrity of the approach and landing."