CRJ-200 First Officer reported a loss of cabin pressurization during climb. Crew continued to destination.

Narrative

I was the First Officer (FO) involved in a flight that resulted in an urgent descent due to a pressurization failure. The aircraft was delivered to us from Maintenance in ZZZ with a deferred R pack (MEL: 21-XX-XX). The Captain and I took time to brief the procedures involved with one-pack operations and made sure to rehearse what we were going to do in order to be compliant with the MEL. As preflight checks were wrapping up; it was noted that an additional 200 pounds of fuel was added above our release fuel; which put us at risk for landing approximately 120 pounds overweight. Miscommunication with the ramp agents also hindered progress in the flight; as a pushback commenced without our explicit permission and before the proper checklists had been completed. Once all checklists and briefings were completed; a pushback; engine start; and taxi out to the runway all took place without incident. Captain was pilot flying for this leg. Because we were on single-pack operations and that this was a first flight of the day; we elected to depart bleeds closed as per recommended by the procedure. Departure out of ZZZ was uneventful; at around 5000 feet; the Captain and I accomplished the recommended bleed swap procedure that would reduce stress on the operating pack; and this went without incident and we continued our climb up to our assigned altitude of FL240. During our climbout; we revisited the potential issue of an overweight landing; and the Captain and I calculated the required fuel that needs to be onboard to avoid an overweight landing. To help burn off fuel and reach this number; we inquired with ATC to give us approx. 10 minutes of delay vectors. Shortly after our first delay vector; a caution CAS message appeared indicating 'L PACK HI TEMP'; which disappeared about a second later. The Captain and I were about to discuss our model to look into this issue and transferred controls to me. Looking over at the cabin altitude; I saw it rising above 8000 feet. I alerted this to the Captain; and it was around this point that we got a 'CABIN ALT' caution message. Seeing that there was no sign of the cabin altitude decreasing and that this was a clear anomaly; we agreed that a descent was probably going to be needed. A short while later (30 sec-1 min); we received a 'CABIN ALT' warning message. The Captain and I immediately donned our oxygen masks she initiated an urgent descent. We both initially had trouble re-establishing communications with each other through the masks (likely in part due to the shock of the situation) but managed to get back on the same page. I began to run our QRC for an urgent descent; item by item. The FO announcement for 'urgent descent' was hindered by some troubleshooting getting my mask's microphone to transmit properly. Due to the intensity of the situation; I cannot definitively recall whether I made the initial PA required by the QRC; or if I did; if it was done so properly. One of the steps in the QRC was to select pass oxy to 'SELECT/ON'; during this step in the heat of the moment; I saw the switch already in the 'ON' position and the masks deployed on the EICAS page (which was induced due to the cabin altitude reaching a maximum of 15;000 feet'. Upon reaching a safe altitude; controls of the airplane stayed with her; I checked in with our Flight Attendant; to assess the condition of her and the cabin. Upon hearing that the condition was good; the Captain and I reviewed to ensure that we complied with all required QRH and QRC procedures; and at the conclusion of so; we elected to continue on to ZZZ1. We flew at 10;000 feet at 310 knots and were in consistent contact with ATC. We flew at 310 knots because the lack of air conditioning meant the cabin was beginning to get uncomfortably warm; and we wanted to get on the ground quickly. Once stabilized in our new cruise; we input new fuel planning numbers to ensure that we would be landing above minimum fuel; and we still would be landing with enough for atleast 3 go-arounds. We continued to check in with our flight attendant and made proper PA announcements. I took over controls of the airplane while the Captain monitored the situation and properly notified Dispatch; Maintenance; and ATC. We executed a visual approach for Runway XXR at ZZZ1; cancelling our priority status in the process due to the situation being under control and not life threatening; landed; and taxied to the gate. Due to the peculiarity of the situation; I was under the belief that Maintenance; who was at gate when we arrived; were going to take the airplane as soon as we disembarked. This; combined with the stress of the situation; meant that I unknowingly did not do a post flight walkaround.Cause: The cause of this event can be attributed to a L pack failure when we were operating on single pack operations. The sudden ensuing cabin depressurization and urgent descent could have contributed to some QRC or standard procedures (such as a post flight walkaround) being done incompletely.Suggestions: A major suggestion would be to not Dispatch aircraft for single pack operations.