AN ACR MLG HAD A SERIES OF MECHANICAL FAILURES THAT DID NOT SERIOUSLY ENDANGER THE FLT.

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THE FLT INCURRED A DELAY AT THE GATE BEFORE PUSHBACK FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF A BATTERY CHARGER. THE FLT PROCEEDED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER PROBS UNTIL THE APCH PHASE. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO 210 KTS; WHEN SLATS WERE EXTENDED THE R HYD QUANTITY AND PRESSURE WENT TO 0. WE REQUESTED VECTORS OFF THE LOC TO GIVE US TIME TO RUN CHKLISTS AND COMPLY WITH AFM PROCS AND PREPARE THE CABIN CREW. WE NOTIFIED ATC OF OUR CONDITION AND EXPLAINED HOW AFTER LNDG WE WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN ON THE RWY UNTIL MAINT COULD SECURE OUR GEAR DOORS AND BE TUGGED TO THE GATE. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL AND WE STOPPED ON THE CTRLINE. WITH THE EMER EQUIP STANDING BY AND MAINT WORKING ON THE GEAR DOORS; WE STARTED THE APU TO SUPPLEMENT CABIN COOLING. ONCE THE APU AIR WAS SELECTED ON; THE CABIN BEGAN FILLING WITH SMOKE AND FUMES. WE IMMEDIATELY SECURED THE APU AND VENTILATED THE CABIN WITH THE L ENG AIR CONDITIONING UNIT. WE WERE TOWED TO THE GATE AND PAX DEPLANED. 2 THINGS I WOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY: 1) DEPLANED ALL 141 PAX AS PLANE WAS DEPWRED FOR BATTERY CHARGER REPLACEMENT. EVEN THOUGH EMER LIGHTING WAS AVAILABLE AND MEGAPHONES COULD HAVE BEEN USED; IT WAS UNCOMFORTABLE FOR ME TO HAVE EVERYONE SITTING ON A DEAD AIRPLANE. I SHOULD HAVE RELIED MORE ON INTUITION TO KNOW IT WAS GOING TO TAKE LONGER THAN MAINT SAID IT WOULD. 2) MY GUT FEELING WAS NOT TO START THE APU; SUSPECTING IT MAY BE SOAKED WITH HYD FLUID; HOWEVER; THIS WAS A LINE CHK BY A CHK AIRMAN IN THE JUMP SEAT AND MY INTUITION WAS INFLUENCED BY HIS SUGGESTION TO START THE APU TO SAVE FUEL.