THE LEAD ACFT OF A 2 ACFT FORMATION INJURED ONE OF ITS CREWMEN WHILE PULLING UP TO AVOID A LIGHT ACFT.

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MY SQUADRON WAS PARTICIPATING IN A WKEND EXERCISE. WE HAD JUST COMPLETED AN AIRDROP AND A FORMATION LEAD CHANGE IN WHICH WE ASSUMED THE #2 POS OF A 2-SHIP FORMATION. WE WERE WITHIN 10 FLYING MI OF THE ATA (APPROX 3 MINS) AND STILL HAD TO GET THE ATIS; GIVE COMMAND POST A CODED MESSAGE; AND ACCOMPLISH 4 CHKLISTS. THE LEAD ACFT ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT APCH SEVERAL TIMES; BUT WAS UNABLE TO GET A RESPONSE DUE TO RADIO SATURATION. LEAD DETERMINED WE WERE GETTING TOO CLOSE TO THE ATA AND TURNED S TO AVOID IT. COM WERE FINALLY ESTABLISHED WHILE ON THE SOUTHERN HDG. WE WERE TOLD TO CONTINUE TO THE S; AND SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED BY APCH FOR AN OVERHEAD RECOVERY TO RWY 35R. THE FORMATION TURNED L AND ROLLED OUT ON INITIAL FOR 35R AT 1500 FT AGL; 200 KIAS; AND APPROX 2000 FT IN TRAIL. 2 MI FROM THE RWY; THE COPLT YELLED OUT 'PULL UP; PULL UP.' I CAME IN WITH THE PWR AND INITIATED A CLB SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ORDER TO AVOID A POSSIBLE CONFLICT. A CREW MEMBER WAS HURT DURING THE CLB. WE TERMINATED THE FORMATION AND PERFORMED A SINGLE SHIP VISUAL RECOVERY. FACTORS/SUGGESTIONS -- OUR ARR TO THE ARPT DIDN'T PROVIDE AN OUT. WE HAD MOUNTAINS ON ONE SIDE AND A RESTR AREA ON THE OTHER. THOROUGH PREFLT PLANNING WOULD HAVE SHOWN THIS AND ALLOWED US TO DESIGN A DIFFERENT ARR; WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN US ADEQUATE TIME TO CONTACT APCH. WE HAD TOO MUCH GOING ON IN THE COCKPIT WITH THE EXERCISE. I SHOULD HAVE STOPPED ALL EXERCISE ACTIVITIES AND CONCENTRATED ON REAL WORLD THREATS. APCH SHOULD NEVER CLR AN ACFT FOR A RECOVERY UNLESS XING TFC IS IN SIGHT OR THERE IS ADEQUATE SEPARATION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 236214: CLRED BY APCH TO MANEUVER FOR OVERHEAD FOR RWY 35R. CONTACTED TWR FOR OVERHEAD; ADVISED TWR FORMATION WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE THROUGH DUE TO #2 HAVING A 'PROB.' TWR CLRED FORMATION FOR DOWNWIND AND LNDG.