AN ACR 2 ENG MLG ACFT DISPATCHED OVER A RTE WHEN THE WX DID NOT ALLOW A LNDG AT AN ADEQUATE ARPT ACCORDING TO WX RPTS AND FORECASTS.

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COMPANY INITIATED NEW SVC IN EXTENDED OVERWATER OP. I AM A CHK AIRMAN AND WAS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM TO TRAIN INSTRUCTORS AND DEVELOP BULLETIN TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE LINE PLTS TO SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY FLY RTE BTWN THESE CITY PAIRS; BOS AND BDA. HOWEVER; WE DID NOT ANTICIPATE THE IMPACT THAT A STORM OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THAT WHICH HIT BOS ON 3/XX/93 WOULD HAVE ON THIS OP WITH RESPECT TO FAR 121.161. SPECIFICALLY; THE ACFT MUST BE OPERATED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ALLOW DIVERT TO SOME AIR FIELD AT ANY POINT ALONG THE RTE WHERE AN ENG FAILURE MIGHT OCCUR; AND LAND AT THAT POINT IN 1 HR IN STILL AIR HAVING LOST AN ENG (340 NM FOR AN MLG). I AM NOT CERTAIN WHEN BOS BECAUSE UNSUITABLE FOR USE; BUT WE DEPARTED BDA WITH BOS FORECAST TO BE MARGINAL; USING DTW AS AN ALTERNATE. ULTIMATELY; WE DIVERTED TO DTW; BUT I REALLY DON'T YET KNOW WHETHER OR NOT WE WERE IN COMPLIANCE WITH 121.161 WHEN WE LEFT KBOS OR KBDA. I AM SEEKING THE 'TRUTH' AT THIS TIME; AND ENDEAVORING TO DEVELOP BETTER GUIDANCE SO PLTS AND DISPATCHERS WILL BE ABLE TO EASILY COMPLY WITH AND UNDERSTAND FAR 121.161. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT HE WAS NOT REQUESTING ANY CLARIFICATIONS AND HAD SINCE CLRED UP THIS MATTER WITHIN THE COMPANY. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE 'E TOPS' APPROVAL AND IT WAS NOT GOING TO BE REQUESTED. HE BELIEVES THAT HIS COMPANY DISPATCHER AND PLTS HAVE BEEN GIVEN NEW DIRECTION IN HANDLING THIS TYPE OF SIT IN THE FUTURE. HE STATED THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH THE FAA FOR FEAR OF 'STIRRING UP' AN UNNECESSARY PROB EVEN THOUGH BE BELIEVES THAT THEY ARE EXCELLENT PEOPLE TO DEAL WITH.