MLG TAXIES PAST HOLD LINE AS ACFT ON TKOF. NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC.

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ON TAXI OUT OF CHA; GND WAS CONTACTED AND CLRNC WAS RECEIVED 'TAXI TO RWY 2; HOLD SHORT OF RWY 33. I ACKNOWLEDGED 'TAXI TO RWY 2; HOLD SHORT OF RWY 33.' THIS WAS DONE AS WE TAXIED OUT OF GATE SINCE WE DON'T PUSHBACK IN CHA. AS WE PROCEEDED ACROSS THE RAMP; I RAN THE PRE- TKOF CHKLIST AND ABOUT THAT SAME TIME THE WT AND BAL INFO ARRIVED VIA ACARS. I BEGAN LOADING THIS INFO INTO THE FMS (ACFT GROSS WT; STAB TRIM; REDUCED THRUST; V SPDS RWY NUMBER ETC). AS WE APCHED RWY 33 I GLANCED UP TO SEE IF WE WERE NEAR THE HOLD SHORT LINE. TO MY SURPRISE; WE HAD PASSED IT. AT THIS SAME INSTANCE GND CTL RADIOED 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 33...STOP!' THE CAPT APPLIED THE BRAKES FIRMLY AND THE ACFT STOPPED ABOUT 10 FT FROM THE RWY EDGE. (WELL PAST THE HOLD LINE). SIMULTANEOUSLY I SAW A LIGHT SINGLE ENG ACFT GO PAST THE NOSE ON TKOF ROLL...A VERY CLOSE CALL! THE CTLR SHOULD BE COMMENDED FOR HER VIGILANCE IN THIS INCIDENT BECAUSE SHE AVERTED A CATASTROPHE! CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS INCIDENT INCLUDE: MY PREOCCUPATION WITH THE DATA ENTRY AND XCHKING OF PERFORMANCE FIGURES INSTEAD OF CLOSELY FOLLOWING OUR PROGRESS TO THE RWY. THE CAPTS FAILURE TO CONFIRM CLR TO CROSS FOLLOWED BY A LACK OF VIGILANCE IN MAKING SURE THE RWY IS CLR BEFORE XING AN ACTIVE RWY. ALSO; THE CAPT MENTIONED THAT THIS HAD BEEN A HARD TRIP WITH LONG DAYS AND SHORT LAYOVERS -- FATIGUE COULD HAVE HINDERED HIS ATTENTIVENESS (I CAME ONTO THE 4TH DAY OF A 4 DAY TRIP). BEFORE XING ACTIVES I ALWAYS ATTEMPT TO AGGRESSIVELY CHK FOR CONFLICTS. AS YOU CAN SEE BELOW MY VISION WAS BLOCKED WITH REGARD TO THE ONCOMING ACFT (I WAS ON R HAND BLIND SIDE OF ACFT).