CAPT OF A PART 135 COMMUTER TOOK OFF OVERWT FOR THE LENGTH OF THE RWY AND COMPLAINS THAT HE IS NOT PROPERLY TRAINED AND IS EXPECTED TO FLY REGARDLESS OF THE WX AND ARPT RWY CONDITIONS.

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THIS RPT PERTAINS TO 2 INCIDENTS -- BOTH UNDER THE SAME FLT NUMBER; BUT ON DIFFERENT LEGS. THE FIRST INCIDENT INVOLVES TKOF PERFORMANCE DATA. THE SECOND INVOLVES AN UNANTICIPATED DELAY ON THE FIRST OF A 3 LEG FLT BTWN 2 FUELING POINTS. NO DAMAGE WAS INVOLVED IN EITHER INCIDENT. DURING BOTH INCIDENTS I USED THE SAME JUDGEMENT AS MY COLLEAGUES AND PREDECESSORS HAVE USED. BUT; THESE ARE ALSO KNOWN AS 'GRAY AREAS.' I AM NEW TO TURBINE ENG CAPTAINCY. AND; GIVEN THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OFTEN UNIQUE TO ALASKA; I HAVE WRITTEN THIS RPT IN HOPES OF SHEDDING LIGHT ON THE GRAY. I SHOULD HAVE SAID 'I'VE BEEN DRINKING.' IT WAS A SUNDAY. I WASN'T SCHEDULED. BUT; THE STATILON MGR CALLED WITH A PROB. OUR T-1040 HAD JUST COMPLETED THE FIRST OF 2 CHARTERS FOR THE SCHOOL IN SHISHMAREFF (SHH). THE TEMP IN SHH WAS MINUS 40 DEGS F. UNBEKNOWNST TO MISS A; WHO WAS FLYING THE T-1040; A MICRO SWITCH HAD FROZEN AND THE FLAPS WOULD NOT RETRACT. SHE HAD CALLED OUR BASE IN NOME (OME) TO CONSULT WITH MAINT AND THEY DECIDED TO SEND A MECH AND AN AIRPLANE. I WAS TO TAKE THE CHIEFTAIN; DROP THE MECH AT SHH; GO EMPTY TO ST. MICHAEL'S (SMK); PICK UP 8 KIDS AND 1 COACH; DROP THEM IN SHH; THEN RETURN OME. AS USUAL; PLANS CHANGED. WHILE PREFLTING THE CHIEFTAIN; I RECEIVED A RPT THAT THE TEMP IN SHH WAS MINUS 40 DEGS F. COMPANY POLICY REQUIRES PERMISSION FROM MAINT TO OPERATE THE CHIEFTAIN IN ANYTHING LESS THAN MINUS 35 DEGS F. I ASKED THE MECH ON DUTY TO GET PERMISSION. PERMISSION WAS NOT GRANTED AND FURTHER INSTRUCTION WERE ISSUED TO TAKE THE BEECHCRAFT C99 AIRLINER. MEANWHILE; THE T-1040'S FLAPS HAVE THAWED OUT AND RETRACTED. AND; MISS A IS ENRTE TO OME. IF WE TAKE THE BEECH 99; MISS A WILL FLY COPLT. THE NEW ROUTING WILL BE OME-SMK-SHH-OME. WHEN SHE ARRIVED AT OME. I RECEIVED A PIREP DIRECTLY FROM HER. SHE INDICATED THAT THE WX WAS REAL GOOD AND THAT THERE WAS LOTS OF WIND; 15- 20 KTS; RIGHT DOWN THE RWY. TEMP 5 DEGS F. UNALAKLEET (UNK) AWOS; 30 NM NE; WAS INDICATING SIMILAR OBSERVATIONS. THE WIND WAS GUSTING TO 30 KTS. VERY FAVORABLE CONDITIONS. THIS LEADS US TO THE FIRST ISSUE AT HAND -- TKOF PERFORMANCE. WITH THE PROJECTED LOAD; REQUIRED FUEL; AND IN A CONFIGN WITH 10 PAX SEATS INSTALLED. WE SHOULD WEIGHT ABOUT 10000 LBS ON DEP FROM SMK. SMK IS IS 2318 FT; GRAVEL SURFACE RWY (TODAY IT'S PACKED SNOW AND GRAVEL). THERE IS ABOUT 100 FT OF UNDECLARED OVERRUN AT EACH END. THERE ARE NO BUILDINGS; TREES OR OBSTACLES AT EITHER END. THE ONLY LIMITING PERFORMANCE CHART FOR THIS FLT IS THE 'ACCELERATE-SLOW' CHART. THIS CHART INDICATES THE LENGTH OF RWY REQUIRED TO ABORT PRIOR TO V1 AND GO OFF THE END OF THE RWY AT 35 KTS. GIVEN THE ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS FOR THE DAY; A 10000 LB TKOF GROSS WT WOULD REQUIRE APPROX 2300 FT. IN ADDITION; THE BEGINNING OF THE PERFORMANCE SECTION STATES THAT FAR 135 REGS PERMIT AN OVERRUN. AFTER THE FACT; MY COLLEAGUES HAVE STATED THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT OVERRUN IS NOT PERMITTED BY THE FAA. IF SO; WHY HAS NOT AN AMENDED PAGE BEEN ADDED TO THE ACFT PLTS OPERATING HANDBOOK (ARPT FACILITY MANUAL)? AFTER QUIZZING; MY COLLEAGUES HAVE UNANIMOUSLY SAID THIS WAS A SOUND OP. YET; I HAVE RECEIVED SEVERE CHASTISING FROM MY CHIEF PLT. HE HAS ESTIMATED THAT I WAS AS MUCH AS 2000 LBS OVERWT. HE HAS STATED THAT I DID NOT ADD AN ADEQUATE SAFETY MARGIN. HE HAS NOT STATED HOW TO DETERMINE A SAFETY MARGIN FOR CONTAMINATED SURFACES. AND; I'M SURE THAT TOPIC WAS NOT COVERED IN TRAINING; BECAUSE WE SPENT LESS THAN 5 MINS ON PERFORMANCE. PERHAPS OUR TRAINING PROGRAM IS MISSING SOMETHING. ENRTE OME-SMK; PEDESTRIANS WERE OBSERVED TRANSITING RWY AREA DURING AN OVERHEAD INSPECTION OF RWY CONDITIONS AND WIND AT SMK. ONE ADDITIONAL CIRCUIT WAS REQUIRED TO ALERT THE PEDESTRIANS OF OUR INTENTIONS. THIS ACTIVITY RESULTED IN SEVERAL ADDITIONAL MINS OF ENRTE TIME. THE ENTIRE FLT WAS PLANNED OME-SMK-SHH-OME. INTERMEDIATE STOPS AT SMK AND SHH. FUEL IS ONLY AVAILABLE AT OME. SMK AND SHH ARE REMOTE BUSH VILLAGES AND DO NOT HAVE FUELING FACILITIES. DEP WT AT SMK WAS TOBE MINIMUM IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE 'ACCELERATE-SLOW FLAPS 30 PERCENT' PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENT. INITIAL FLT PLANNING AT OME DID NOT CONSIDER TIME OVERHEAD FOR PEDESTRIANS AT SMK. THEREFORE; I DEPARTED SHH-OME WITH APPROX 1/10 OF AN HR SHORT OF THE REQUIRED FUEL RESERVES FOR NIGHT VFR. THE FUEL GAUGES OF THIS ACFT INDICATE BY THE 100 LBS AND HAVE A LITTLE MARK EVERY 50 LBS. FUEL OBSERVED ON GAUGES DEPARTING SHH WAS APPROX 800 LBS. FUEL ON PAPER; SHH-OME IS 750 LBS; AND WAS DETERMINED IN CONFORMANCE WITH COMPANY PROC. COMPANY PROC IS NOT WRITTEN. I HAVE FLOWN WITH; AND OBSERVED; EVERY SENIOR CAPT; 2 ASSISTANT CHIEF PLTS; AND 2 CHIEF PLTS AT THIS COMPANY. AFTER ESTABLISHING FUEL REQUIRED FOR FLT; A 600 LB/HR FUEL BURN IS USED AGAINST FLT TIME. THIS IS A GENERIC NUMBER AND NO CONSIDERATION IS APPLIED TO FUEL BURNED DURING START AND TAXI. EVERYONE HERE USES THE SAME PROC. I LANDED AT OME; CAVU AND EXCELLENT FORECASTS; WITH APPROX 38 MINS FUEL REMAINING ON PAPER. GAUGES ARE NOT THE MOST RELIABLE DIALS IN THESE AIRPLANES. THE ONLY WAY TO KNOW WHAT YOU'VE REALLY GOT IS TO SEE IT. THE BIG QUESTION HERE IS: IN WHAT INSTANCES IS FUEL RESERVE TO BE USED? AFTER AN EXTRA 6 MINUTES OVERHEAD SMK AND KNOW 6 MINS INTO MY PROJECTED VFR NIGHT FUEL RESERVE; WITH 2 LEGS TO GO; AND NOW KNOWING THAT I WILL RETURN TO OME SHORT OF THE REQUIRED NIGHT FUEL RESERVE SHOULD I HAVE INTERRUPTED MY PLANNED FLT BTWN 2 FUELING FACILITIES. FLOWN OUT OF MY WAY TO PUMP ON 15 GALLONS; ON A NIGHT WITH VERY FAVORABLE FORECASTS? MOST OF MY COLLEAGUES IN WESTERN ALASKA BELIEVE THAT RESERVE IS THERE FOR JUST SUCH CONTINGENCIES; AND THEY DO NOT BELIEVE I ACTED OUTSIDE OF THE BOUNDS OF THE REGS NOR REASONABLENESS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: UNABLE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE RPTR SINCE ONLY TELEPHONE CONTACT REVEALED THAT HE DID NO LONGER WORK FOR THE PART 135 OPERATOR IN NOME; AK; WHICH PROMPTED HIS QUESTIONS.