ACR WDB SPED BELOW 10000 FT.

Narrative

FLT FROM LAX TO IAH DC-10-30 RELATIVELY LIGHT WT TKOF; 6 KT TAILWIND; WET (RAIN IN LOS ANGELES) RWY USED MAX THRUST PER COMPANY SOP. AT 1000 FT (APPROX) WAS HANDED OFF TO SOCAL DEP. COPLT HANDLING RADIO CONTACTED SOCAL. ON CALL-UP; CTLR RESPONDED WITH CLRED TO 5000 FT (FROM 2000 FT) AND SAID 'X; IS THAT YOU.' I WAS MAKING COMMANDS AT WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TERMINATION OF CONTACT; IE; 'FLAPS UP; CLB PWR; N1.' CTLR SAID 'THIS IS (SO AND SO) AND I JUST GOT TO LAX; ETC. FO WAS RESPONDING TO CTLR AND NOT TO ME. CONSEQUENTLY WITH VERT SPD OF 1000 FPM AND MAX TKOF PWR AND IMC CONDITIONS; ACCELERATION WAS EXTREMELY RAPID. I RECOGNIZED THINGS WEREN'T GETTING DONE AND GOT THE FLAPS AND SLATS RETRACTED BEFORE LIMITATIONS WERE EXCEEDED BUT DIDN'T NOTICE THAT THRUST WAS STILL AT TKOF AND GOT TO 300 KTS AT ABOUT 2500-3000 FT. FINALLY GOT THRUST REDUCED (ACTUALLY CRUISE THRUST WAS WHAT I CALLED FOR AND WAS SUFFICIENT) AND REST OF FLT WAS SOP. IT'S IMPORTANT FOR A CTLR TO REALIZE HVY WORKLOAD AT THAT POINT AND KEEP 'PERSONALS' TO A MINIMUM (ESPECIALLY IN IMC). IT'S IMPORTANT FOR PNF TO FOCUS ON JOB AT HAND AND NOT BE DIVERTED BY 'PERSONALS' AT THIS TIME. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR PLT MAKING COMMANDS TO MAKE SURE THEY ARE BEING ACCOMPLISHED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO WAS NEW TO THE BASE AND THE OP. THE RPTING CAPT HAD KNOWN THE FO FROM YRS BEFORE. WHEN THIS INCIDENT HAPPENED; THE CAPT WAS NOW FLYING SOLO AND GOT A LITTLE BIT OVERLOADED. THE CAPT CHIDED THE FO; WHO TOOK THE ADVICE VERY WELL.