ACFT EQUIP PROB -- BOTH FMGC FAIL XING RESTR NOT MET.

Narrative

ACFT WAS DISPATCHED WITH #1 FMGC AND AUTOPLT INOP. DURING DSCNT FLT WAS GIVEN RESTR TO CROSS HOLEY AT 11000 FT. WHILE DSNDING THROUGH 20000 FT ON A MINIMUM PWR DSCNT (FMGS MANAGED); #2 FMGC FAILED RESULTING IN COMPLETE LOSS OF MANAGED NAV; LOSS OF MONITORED VORS; AUTOPLT; AUTO THRUST (THRUST LOCK); ALL PICTORIAL NAV. USING RMP (RADIO MGMNT PANEL) CREW MANUALLY TUNED VOR AND SELECTED COURSE. UPON CONFIRMATION OF VOR; WE FOUND WE HAD MISSED HOLEY INTXN XING BY 1200 FT. NOTE: WE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING OUR POS WITH RESPECT TO VOR SINCE FMGC NORMALLY CTLS VORS; AND ABSENT OF FMGC; THERE IS NO POS INFO DISPLAYED OR AVAILABLE. AFTER LEVELING; WE WERE ABLE TO RESTORE FMGC #2 AND WERE REQUIRED TO RELOAD ALL DATA INTO FMGC. ONLY IRS POS INFO WAS AVAILABLE WHEN FMGC #2 CAME ON LINE. WE EVENTUALLY RECOVERED AUTOPLT; AUTO THRUST AND FMGC FOR DURATION OF FLT. THE LOSS OF BOTH FMGC'S; HOWEVER REMOTE; OCCURRED. CREW ACTIONS WERE APPROPRIATE FOR CONDITIONS AND THERE WAS NO CONFLICT AT ANY TIME. WITH THE ADVANCED AUTOMATION IN THE A320; COMPLETE LOSS OF NAV BECOMES A SERIOUS PROB; SINCE IT IMPACTS NOT ONLY NAV; BUT ALSO AUTOPLT; AND AUTO THRUST AS WELL; CREATING A HIGH WORKLOAD ON CREW; ESPECIALLY IN A DSCNT. AIRBUS STATES THAT THE AUTOMATION SHOULD MAKE 1 PLUS 1 EQUAL 3. (BEING 2 CREW MEMBERS PLUS AUTOFLT.) THIS WAS A CASE WHERE 1 PLUS 1 EQUALED 0. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ACCORDING TO THE RPTR; THE MAJOR DISCREPANCY WHICH CAME TO LIGHT AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT IS; THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THE MEL'S FOR A FAILED FMGC (FLT MGMT GUIDANCE COMPUTER). THE ONLY MAINT ITEM DEFERRED; IN CASE OF FMGC FAIL; IS THE ASSOCIATED AUTOPLT. CONSEQUENTLY; THE ONLY CLUE THE PLTS HAVE OF THE FMGC FAILURE IS THE MESSAGE ON THE NAV DISPLAY; 'SET OFFSIDE RNG/MODE;' AND ON THE PFD (PRIMARY FLT DISPLAY) FMA (FLT MODE ANNUNCIATOR). IN THIS CASE; WITH THE #1 FMGC FAILED THE #1 AND #2 FMA'S SHOWED '2FD2' WHICH TELLS THE PLTS THAT ONLY THE #2 FLT DIRECTOR IS AVAILABLE. DURING THE DSCNT WITH FAILURE OF THE #2 FMGC; BOTH NAV DISPLAYS WENT BLANK; AUTOPLT DISENGAGED; AUTOTHROTTLES FROZE IN POS WITH THE PFD MODE ANNUNCIATOR MESSAGE 'THR LK' (FLASHING AMBER); AND LOSS OF ALL NAV RADIOS. CAPT RPTR TURNED THE ACFT CTL OVER TO THE FO WHILE HE SELECTED MANUAL VOR AND SUCCEEDED TUNING THE RBV VOR ON THE WARD 4 ARR TO EWR. BUT; DUE TO THE TIME DELAY AND LOSS OF NAV; THE XING RESTR AT HOLEY WAS NOT MET. ATC MADE NO MENTION. THEN; THE #2 FMGC CAME BACK ON THE LINE WITH ALL SUBSYS OPERATING NORMALLY. POST FLT MAINT CHK REVEALED NO DISCREPANCY. ON THE NEXT LEG RPTR SAYS THEY WERE ON APCH; IN AREA OF TSTMS; WHEN AGAIN THE #2 FMGC FAILED. THE FLC WAS MORE PREPARED THEN AND IMMEDIATELY MANUALLY TUNED THE ILS FREQ FOR THE APCH. DURING THE APCH; HOWEVER; THE #2 ILS (NOW ON THE CAPT NAV DISPLAY) WAS INTERMITTENT; BUT THE FO'S WAS NORMAL. AFTER INTERCEPTING THE ILS IT WAS VERY UNRELIABLE. ACFT BROKE OUT OF WX AT 2000 FT AND CONTINUED VISUALLY. AFTER TOUCHDOWN THE FO LOST THE ILS #1. RPTR SAYS THAT SEVERAL ISSUES NEED TO BE ADDRESSED: 1) WHEN AN FMGC IS INOP OR INTERMITTENT; INCLUDE IT IN THE MEL AND PULL THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER TO ELIMINATE SPURIOUS SIGNALS. 2) POSTFLT MAINT PRINTOUT (CENTRALIZED DATA FAULT DISPLAY SYS; CFDS) SHOULD BE REVIEWED BY THE PLTS WITH MAINT. IT WOULD EDUCATE THE PLTS CONCERNING FAULTS WHICH OCCURRED ON THEIR FLT. NOT ONLY DOES IT INCLUDE ALL THE FAULTS OR FAILURES; BUT ALSO LISTS THEM IN REAL TIME. THUS; THE PLTS CAN LEARN WHY AND WHEN SUBSYS FAIL. 3) PLTS SHOULD BE EXPOSED TO THESE TYPE OF FAILURE SITS DURING TRAINING IN ORDER TO BE BETTER PREPARED.